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More than thirty years have passed since Congress enacted Title IX, the 
statute prohibiting sex discrimination by schools, colleges, and universities 
that receive federal funding.' In that time, Congress has confirmed 2-and 
reconfirmed'-the statute's application to college athletic programs, and 
the Supreme Court has strengthened the statute's enforcement by 
construing a private right of action for both injunctive relief4 and, in certain 
cases, money damages.5 Bolstered by these measures, Title IX is duly 
credited for increasing the number of athletic opportunities for women and 
girls.6 
But at the college level, female athletes still have far fewer opportunities 
to participate in athletics relative to their male peers.' At most colleges and 
universities, the percentage of student athletes who are female is lower than 
the percentage of female college students.8 One reason for this is that Title 
1. Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972,20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688 (2000). 
2. Gender and Athletics Act, Pub. L. No. 93-380, § 844, 88 Stat. 484, 612 (1974) (codified 
at 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2000)). 
3. Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28 (1988) (codified 
at 20 U.S.C. § 1687 (2000)). This statute expressly provided that Title IX applied to an entire 
educational institution, regardless of the specific programs receiving federal funds. Id. Congress 
passed this statute to nullify the Supreme Court's interpretation that Title IX only applied to 
the specific programs receiving federal funds, Grove City Coll. v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 563-68 
(1984), a limitation that effectively insulated from Title IX athletic programs that do not receive 
any federal funds. 
4. SeeCannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 717 (1979). 
5. Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Schs., 503 U.S. 60, 76 (1992) (allowing a plaintiff to 
recover money damages when the defendant's violation of Title IX-in that case, an act of 
sexual harassment-was intentional). See generallyJackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 
167 (2005) (extending Title IX's private right of action to include a coach's claim that a school 
fired him in retaliation for complaining about sex discrimination against his players). 
6. SEC'Y OF EDUC.'S COMM'N ON OPPORTUNITY IN ATHLETICS, "OPEN TO ALL": TITLE IX AT 
THIRTY 13 (Feb. 28, 2003) [hereinafter COMMISSION REPORT], available at 
http://www.ed.gov/about/bdscomm/list/athletics/title9report.pdf. For example, in 1971­
1972, the 30,000 women who participated in intercollegiate and college recreational athletics 
made up 15% of all participants. By 2000-2001, the number of female athletes had increased to 
150,000 (a 400% increase). Id. at 13. 
7. Women generally make up only 42% of all college athletes, while constituting 56% of 
enrolled undergraduates. COMMISSION REPORT, supranote 6, at 13. Moreover, women generally 
receive 43% of athletic scholarships, and their sports receive 32% of athletic departments' 
operating budgets. Id. at 19. A disparity exists at earlier levels of education as well-about one 
million fewer girls than boys participate in high school sports. Id. at 13-14. The 
disproportionality at the college level is emphasized here due to this Article's particular focus 
on new regulatory changes that affect Title IX's application to college and university athletics. 
8. See Lee Sigelman & Paul J. Wahlbeck, GenderProportionalityin IntercollegiateAthletics: The 
Mathematics of Title IX Compliance, 80 Soc. SCI. Q. 518, 524, 528 (1999) (noting that only a 
"handful" of NCAA Division I schools satisfied proportionality compliance); Deborah J. 
Anderson et al., Gender Equity in Intercollegiate Athletics: Determinants of Title IX Compliance 3 
(Cornell Higher Educ. Research Inst., Working Paper No. 45, 2004), available at 
http://www.ilr.cornell.edu/wp/cheri wp45.pdf (reporting 2001-2002 data that show women 
are still underrepresented among athletes at most schools; the average proportionality gap 
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IX and its implementing regulations do not mandate that universities attain 
substantial proportionality. 9 In fact, the regulatory compliance policy that 
the Office for Civil Rights ("OCR")' 0 has administered since 1979 allows for 
three separate and alternative measures (or "prongs") for complying with 
Title IX. Universities' efforts to attain compliance under the proportionality 
prong are often stymied by budget constraints, perceived or otherwise," that 
prevent universities from achieving proportionality by simply adding 
opportunities for women. And while universities could alternatively attain 
proportionality by capping or reducing athletic opportunities for men, 12 this 
approach is unpopular among male athletes, their coaches, and their
3 
supporters.1 
among all schools in the sample was 13%); WOMEN'S SPORTS FOUND., TITLE IX AT 30: 
ATHLETICS RECEIVE C+ 2 (2002), available at http://womenssportsfoundation.org/binary­
data/WSF._ARTICLE/pdf__file/902.pdf (reporting that 23% of "Division I colleges provided 
athletic opportunities for women within five percentage points of female student enrollment"). 
The increase in the number of college-bound women has made proportionality compliance an 
increasingly tall order. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 6, at 13 (noting that women make up 
56% of all college undergraduates). The more women are represented in the student-body 
population, the more likely they are to receive proportionately fewer athletic opportunities. 
Anderson et al., supra,at 3 (finding that universities with a large share of undergraduates who 
are female also have a large proportionality gap). 
9. Proportionality need not be exact-the policy calls for a ratio of male/female athletes 
that is "substantially" proportionate to the male/female ratio of undergraduate enrollment. 
Dep't of Health, Educ. and Welfare, Office for Civil Rights, A Policy Interpretation: Title IX and 
Intercollegiate Athletics, 44 Fed. Reg. 71,413, 71,418 (Dec. 11, 1979) [hereinafter 1979 Policy 
Interpretation]. "Substantially" is never quantitatively defined, but no school that has athletic 
participation rates within five percentage points of the undergraduate enrollment has been 
found to violate Tide IX. Sigelman & Wahlbeck, supranote 8, at 525. 
10. 1979 Policy Interpretation, supra note 9, at 71,418. The Office for Civil Rights became 
a division of the Department of Education when the Department became effective in 1980. 
Department of Education Organization Act, Pub. L. No. 96-88, 93 Stat. 668 (1979). 
11. Donald E. Shelton, Equally Bad Is Not Good: Allowing Title IX "Compliance" &y the 
Elimination of Men's Collegiate Sports, 34 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 253, 261 (2001) (arguing that if 
financial constraints truly motivated universities' decisions to eliminate teams, they would start 
with expensive teams, like football, given that, except for the top forty or fifty Division I schools, 
most lose large sums of money on football). 
12. A General Accounting Office study found that 28% of the 948 four-year colleges that 
added one or more women's teams between 1981 and 2001 also reduced the number of men's 
opportunities. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-01-297, INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS: 
FOUR-YEAR COLLEGES' EXPERIENCES ADDING AND DISCONTINUING TEAMS 14-15 (Mar. 2001) 
[hereinafter GAO STUDY], availableat http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d01297.pdf; see also Elisa 
Hatlevig, Title IX Compliance: Looking Past the ProortionalityProng, 12 SPORTS LAW. J. 87, 97 
(2005). Compared head-to-head, however, the number of eliminated men's teams-386­
nearly doubled the number of eliminated women's teams. GAO STUDY, supra,at 14. 
13. One hundred seventy-one wrestling teams, comprising 2,648 individual opportunities 
for collegiate wrestlers, were eliminated between 1981 and 2001. GAO STUDY, supra note 12, at 
11, 13. As a result of these losses, wrestlers and their allies have brought many (unsuccessful) 
challenges to Title IX and proportionality compliance. See, e.g., Nat'l Wrestling Coaches Ass'n v. 
Dep't of Educ., 366 F.3d 930, 935, 949 (D.C. Cir. 2004); Chalenor v. Univ. of N.D., 291 F.3d 
1042, 1046 (8th Cir. 2002) (unsuccessfully challenging a university's decision to eliminate 
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This double bind causes many colleges and universities to strive for 
compliance with the second or third compliance prongs instead of 
proportionality. Under the second prong, a university can satisfy its Tide IX 
compliance obligations-notwithstanding a disproportionate distribution of 
athletic opportunities-by showing a history and continuing practice of 
expanding athletic opportunities for women. 14 Because it is impossible to 
show a continuing practice of expanding women's opportunities without 
eventually reaching a distribution of opportunities that complies with prong 
one, prong two is, by its terms, an interim measure of compance. 
Prong three allows a university to justify its disparate distribution of 
athletic opportunities by demonstrating that it fully and effectively 
accommodates its female students' interests and abilities in athletics. 6 But 
determining the extent to which women are interested in athletics is a 
complex problem. Social structures, including signals from universities that 
devalue women's sports as compared to men's, have influenced women's 
interests in athletics and are responsible, to some degree, for lack of athletic 
interest among women. As long as these social structures continue to relate 
to athletics in a gender-specific manner, it is impossible to isolate the extent 
to which women's interest in athletics is socially constructed. Under a theory 
of equality that accounts for the effect of these social structures (which I 
herein call "structuralist equality"), taking into account women's lack of 
interest in athletics relative to their male peers is ineffective and circular. 
OCR and the federal courts have, to some extent, recognized that social 
structures, including colleges and universities, have constructed women's 
interests in sports and have been reluctant to make prong three an easy or 
wrestling in pursuit of proportionality compliance); Miami Univ. Wrestling Club v. Miami Univ., 
302 F.3d 608, 609-10 (6th Cir. 2002) (same); Gonyo v. Drake Univ., 879 F. Supp. 1000, 1002-03 
(S.D. Iowa 1995) (same). 
14. 1979 Policy Interpretation, supra note 9, at 71,414. 
15. "[I]n light of the thirty years since Title IX's passage, it is difficult for any college to 
boast a history and continuing practice of program expansion for women if the school still does 
not provide proportionally equal opportunities for both sexes." Kimberly A. Yuracko, One for 
You and One for Me: Is Title IX's Sex-Based ProportionalityRequirement for College Varsity Athletic 
PositionsDefensible?, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 731, 741 (2003); see also Roberts v. Colo. State Bd. of 
Agric., 998 F.2d 824, 830 (10th Cir. 1993) (insisting that a school demonstrate both a history 
and genuinely continuingpractice to satisfy prong two, while also recognizing that "in times of 
economic hardship, few schools will be able to ... continu[e] to expand their women's athletic 
programs"). 
Prong-two compliance, while appropriately considered an interim manner of 
compliance, should not be confused with interim proportionality. While proportionality can be 
achieved by increasing opportunities for women and/or reducing opportunities for men, OCR 
has explained that only program expansion for women satisfies prong two. OFFICE FOR CIVIL 
RIGHTS, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., CLARIFICATION OF INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS POLICY GUIDANCE: 
THE THREE-PART TEST (Jan. 16, 1996) [hereinafter 1996 CLARIFICATION], available at 
http://www.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/clarific.htnl. 
16. 1979 Policy Interpretation, supra note 9, at 71,414. 
91 IOWA LAWREVIEW [2006] 
attractive compliance option.1 7 OCR and the courts include qualitative and 
subjective factors, such as athletic interest in women's sports generated 
outside the university, as relevant to the question of whether a university 
fully and effectively accommodates women's interests in athletics. This multi­
faceted approach ratchets up the compliance bar under prong three. It also 
ensures that proportionality under prong one remains the only permanent 
compliance option subject to a qualitative formula that measures predictable 
factors within the institution's control. As a result, institutions seeking a truly
"safe harbor""' from liability unhappily view proportionality compliance as 
their only real, long-term option for complying with Title IX. 19 However, 
when the regulated institutions complained that they were being compelled 
toward prong-one proportionality compliance, OCR espoused that the test 
was flexible and that the prongs were equally favored. 0 Confusion ensued.2' 
In 2005, OCR clarified prong three by allowing universities to 
administer surveys to their enrolled female students and rely on the results 
to demonstrate that women's interests-and as a result, prong three-are 
satisfied.22 While a university is obligated to expand its offerings to 
accommodate unmet interest that the survey reveals, the survey's 
methodology can make that outcome unlikely.23 As a result, prong three 
compliance will not only be easier to attain, but from a university counsel's 
perspective, it will be a strong, reliable bulwark against enforcement actions 
17. Prong three makes it "difficult for a college to defend its lack of proportional 
opportunities by arguing that it has fully accommodated women's interests and abilities." 
Yuracko, supra note 15, at 741; see also infra Part III.B (explaining how the courts have rejected 
watered-down interpretations of prong-three compliance). 
18. OCR itself used this phrase in describing the proportionality prong. 1996 
CLARIFICATION, supranote 15, at 1. 
19. See Pederson v. La. State Univ., 213 F.3d 858, 878 (5th Cir. 2000) (rejecting a lower 
court's suggestion that proportionality was not determinative of Title IX compliance in the 
context of athletic participation); Sigelman & Wahlbeck, supra note 8, at 521 ("Realistically, 
then, the compliance issue boils down to whether a school can pass the proportionality test."); 
Yuracko, supra note 15, at 741 (explaining why compliance "most often comes down to the 
proportionality requirement"); COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 6, at 23-24; cf. Jeffrey H. 
Orleans, An End to the Odyssey: EqualAthletic Opportunitiesfor Women, 3 DuKEJ. GENDER L. & POL'Y 
131, 144 (1996) (suggesting OCR intended prongs two and three to be transitional "bridges" 
rather than permanent compliance measures). 
20. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., FURTHER CLARIFICATION OF 
INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS POLICY GUIDANCE REGARDING TITLE IX COMPLANCE [sic] (July 11, 
2003) [hereinafter 2003 CLARIFICATION], available at http://www.ed.gov/about/offices/ 
list/ocr/title9guidancefinal.html; OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., ADDITIONAL 
CLARIFICATION OF INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS POLICY: THREE-PART TEST-PART THREE 1 (Mar. 
17, 2005) [hereinafter 2005 CLARIFICATION], available at http://www.ed.gov/ 
about/offices/list/ocr/docs/tide9guidanceadditional.pdf. 
21. COMMISSION REPORT, supranote 6, at 25-26. 
22. 2005 CLARIFICATION, supranote 20, at 5; see also infra Part II.B. 
23. See infra Part II.B. 
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and lawsuits. In other words, interest-defined compliance will be a truly
"equally favored" prong. 
However, while the 2005 Clarification restores genuine flexibility to the 
three-prong test, it does so in disregard for, and at the expense of, the 
structuralist-equality concerns that courts have recognized. Without the 
more volatile, uncertain brand of immunity that the pre-2005 prong three 
offered, universities now have no regulatory incentive to strive for a more 
proportionate distribution of athletic opportunities. Instead, through their 
disparate offerings, they will continue to position women's athletics at the 
margins and contribute to society's perception of athletics as primarily 
masculine activities. This "antinormalization" of women's participation helps 
to negatively construct women's interests in sports. 
Part I of this Article provides background on Title IX and its regulatory 
regime. 24 Part II describes and critiques the Model SurVey15 that institutions 
may now use under the 2005 Clarification. 26 Part III argues that the interest-
survey policy is inherently inconsistent with the structuralist equality goals of 
Title IX. That Part describes how various social structures, including 
educational institutions and Title IX itself, have constructed women's 
interests in athletics by antinormalizing their athletic participation; 7 how 
the federal appellate courts and the three-prong policy itself espouse a 
version of Title IX rooted in structuralist equality;2s and how the newly 
clarified version of the three-prong policy undermines this structuralist 
equality.21 
Part IV argues that repealing the 2005 Clarification and restoring the 
agency's former interpretation of the three-prong policy will not resolve the 
inherent tension between the three-prong policy and OCR's express desire 
to give universities a flexible test with more than one compliance endpoint.
3 0 
To resolve this tension, OCR has two choices. It could abandon the 
"flexibility" rhetoric and acknowledge that, to be consistent with the 
structuralist equality reflected in Title IX, prong three, like prong two, is 
only justified as an interim compliance measure. Or it could offer an 
alternative to proportionality compliance that is defined by an objective 
measure other than interest. This Article suggests that proportionate 
funding (as opposed to proportionate number of opportunities) would be 
an appropriate alternative "fourth prong" because it would require the 
24. See infra Part I. 
25. See infra Part II.A. 
26. See infraPart II.B. 
27. See infra Part III.A. 
28. See infra Part III.B. 
29. See inftaPart III.C. 
30. See infraPart IV. 
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university to signal equal valuation of women's sports, mitigating the social 
forces that have antinormalized women's participation in sports. 
I. TITLE IX AND REGULATORY BACKGROUND 
To place OCR's new Model Survey approach to Title IX compliance in 
context, this Part first provides background on Title IX, its implementing 
regulations, and the various policy interpretations and clarifications that 
OCR has released over the years. Title IX of the Education Amendments of 
197231 prohibits sex discrimination by any educational institution receiving 
federal support,32 a broad class of institutions that includes the vast majority 
of accredited colleges and universities, as well as secondary and elementary 
schools. Though Title IX is perhaps best known for prohibiting sex 
discrimination in athletics, 3 the original statute does not expressly address 
that context. In fact, Congress enacted Title IX in response to extensive 
findings of discrimination against women in the classroom.34 It apparently
5 
paid little attention to Title IX's application to athletics. 
3
However, as the OCR3 6 began its task of promulgating Title IX's 
implementing regulations, the issue of athletics quickly became the center 
of public and regulatory debate. In response, Congress amended Title IX, 
directing OCR to make "reasonable [regulatory] provisions considering the 
nature of particular sports" in intercollegiate athletics. 37 The implementing 
regulations promulgated pursuant to this mandate, along with OCR's 
periodic policy interpretations, define what it means for an educational 
institution's athletic program to discriminate "on the basis of sex." 
31. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688 (2000). 
32. Id. § 1681 (a) ("No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded 
from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any 
education program or activity receiving federal financial assistance."). Nearly all colleges and 
universities, and most high schools and middle schools, receive some federal funds. B. Glenn 
George, Fifty/Fifty:EndingSex Segregationin School Sports, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 1107, 1107 (2002). 
33. JODY FEDER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., TITLE IX, SEX DISCRIMINATION AND 
INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS: A LEGAL OVERVIEW 2 (2004). 
34. Cohen v. Brown Univ., 101 F.3d 155, 165 (1st Cir. 1996) (citing 118 CONG. REC. 5804 
(1972) (statement of Sen. Bayh)). 
35. SARAH K. FIELDS, FEMALE GLADIATORS: GENDER, LAW, AND CONTACT SPORT IN AMERICA 
11 (2005) (noting that the only discussion of Title IX and sports was a comment by Title IX's 
co-sponsor, Senator Birch Bayh, who said that the law would not mandate desegregation of 
football teams and men's locker rooms). 
36. OCR was a division of what was then the Department of Health, Education, and 
Welfare. OCR is now located in the Department of Education. 
37. The so-called "Javits Amendment," named after its sponsor, Jacob K. Javits of New 
York, authorized OCR to regulate college athletics. Gender and Athletics Act, Pub. L. No. 93­
380, § 844, 88 Stat. 484, 612 (1974). Congress passed the Javits Amendment after rejecting an 
amendment proposed by Senator John Tower of Texas that would have exempted revenue-
producing sports, such as men's football and men's basketball. See FIELDS, supranote 35, at 11; 
George, supra note 32, at 1113-14. 
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This Part will first examine the implementing regulations that OCR has 
promulgated to govern athletic programs pursuant to Title IX. Second, it 
will analyze the sources of the three-prong test: OCR's 1979 Policy 
Interpretation of the implementing regulations' equal-opportunity-in­
participation requirement and subsequent policy statements clarifying the 
three-prong test. (The relationship between the statute, the regulation, and 
the various policy statements is illustrated in Figure 1 below.) Finally, it will 
address the Commission on Opportunity in Athletics, whose 2003 findings 
illustrate and contextualize the political debate about the three-prong policy 
and whose recommendations included the interest-survey concept that OCR 
adopted in the 2005 Clarification. 
FIGURE 1: TITLE IX STATUTES, REGULATIONS, AND POLICIES 
federally funded education institutions. 
Implementing Regulations Governing Athletic Programs 
Separate: Institutions may maintain single-sex teams in contact sports. 
Equal: 
Scholarships: Individual Participation: Other factors: Equipment, 
scholarships must be equal Opportunities must coaching, schedules, 
in amount (though not accommodate the interests facilities, etc. must be equal 
necessarily in number). and abilities of both sexes, between men's and 
women's programs. 
1979 Policy Interpretation 
Prong One: Prong Two: Prong Three: 
Opportunities for History and Full and effective 
female athletes continued practice accommodation of 
substantially of expanding women's interests 
proportionate to opportunities for and abilities 
women's women 
enrollment 
1996 Clarification: Standard is whether there is "unmet interest" among female 
students in a particular sport and whether the institution would be able to 
"sustain a team" that would enjoy "a reasonable expectation of competition." 
Student questionnaires, among other measures, such as regional and local 
interest, would be used to determine whether this standard was met. 
2005 Clarification: Institutions may use Model Survey results to measure whether 
they are fully and effectively accommodating female students' interests and 
abilities. 
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A. THE IMPLEMENTING REGULATIONS 
The implementing regulations to Title IX, promulgated in 1975 and 
substantively unchanged since then, contain several provisions governing 
intercollegiate, interscholastic, club, and intramural athletics sponsored by 
federally funded institutions." These regulations convey two themes-
separate and equal. Schools may retain sex-segregated teams, at least in 
contact sports.3 9 Nevertheless, to ensure these separate programs are still 
equal,40 the regulations require that institutions provide "equal athletic 
,,41
opportunity for both sexes. 
There are three components of the implementing regulations that seek 
to ensure that separate athletic programs for men and women are, in some 
respects, equal. 4' First, the most important factor in deciding whether an 
institution satisfies the equal opportunity requirement is whether 
opportunities for participation "effectively accommodate the interests and 
abilities of both sexes." 43 This requirement of equality in participation is the 
"heartland"44 of the equal-opportunity requirement because it seeks to 
ensure a nondiscriminatory distribution of athletic opportunities. As 
explained in the next section, the three-prong test interprets this regulatory 
provision. Second, the regulations provide that OCR will consider other 
factors, such as equitable distribution of equipment, access to facilities, 
compensation of coaches, and publicity, to ensure that the quality of the 
women's program is comparable to the quality of the men's program. 45 
38. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41 (2005). 
39. Id.The "Separate Teams" regulation provides that "a recipient may operate or sponsor 
separate teams for members of each sex where selection of such teams is based upon 
competitive skill or the activity involved is a contact sport." Id. In the absence of a women's team 
in a particular sport, the institution must let a woman try out for the men's team, as long as the 
sport in which she is seeking to participate is a non-contact sport. Id. Contact sports are 
"boxing, wrestling, rugby, ice hockey, football, basketball and other sports the purpose or major 
activity ofwhich involves bodily contact." Id. 
40. See FIELDS, supranote 35, at 11 (reporting that OCR considered a co-ed team approach 
but enacted a separate-but-equal framework instead); see also Kelley v. Bd. of Trs., Univ. of Ill., 
35 F.3d 265, 271 (7th Cir. 1994) (noting that the regulations do not mandate co-ed teams and 
instead require that separate teams provide equal opportunities to both sexes). 
41. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c) ("A recipient which operates or sponsors interscholastic, 
intercollegiate, club, or intramural athletics shall provide equal athletic opportunity for 
members of both sexes.'). 
42. See generally VALERIE BONNETrE & LAMAR DANIEL, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., TITLE IX 
ATHLETICS INVESTIGATOR'S MANUAL (1990) (separating the compliance factors into three major 
categories: effective accommodation (measured by the three-prong compliance test), 
scholarships, and other factors). 
43. 34C.F.R. § 106.41(c)(1). 
44. Cohen v. Brown Univ. (Cohen 1), 991 F.2d 888, 897 (1st Cir. 1993). 
45. See 34 C.F.R. § 106.41 (c) (2)-(10) (listing "[s]cheduling of games and practice time"; 
"[t]ravel and per diem allowance[s]"; "[o]pportunity to receive coaching and academic 
tutoring"; "[pirovision of locker rooms, practice and competitive facilities"; "[p]rovision of 
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Third, a separate regulatory provision requires that athletic scholarships be 
awarded in proportion to the number of students of each sex participating 
in interscholastic or intercollegiate athletics. 46 One factor that does not 
enter into OCR's formula for equal opportunity is funding. The 
implementing regulations expressly state that compliance does not require 
equal aggregate funding for men's and women's athletic programs. 
4 7 
B. THE THREE-PRONG COMPLIANCEPOLICY 
In 1979, OCR published a Policy Interpretation of the regulatory 
requirement that educational institutions "effectively accommodate the 
" interests and abilities of members of both sexes. 0 8 The Policy Interpretation 
sets forth three alternative measures of compliance-known as the three-
prong test-to determine whether institutions satisfy the equal-participation 
requirement. As noted above, these three prongs are (1) a substantial 
proportionality between the percentage of student athletes who are female 
to the percentage of students who are female; (2) a history and continuing 
practice of expanding women's athletic programs; and (3) full and effective 
accommodation of women 's
49 interests and abilities in athletics. 
50 
medical and training facilities and services"; "[p]rovision of housing and dining facilities and 
services"; and "[p]ublicity"); see also 1979 Policy Interpretation, supra note 9, at 71,417 (adding 
recruiting services and other support services). 
46. 34 C.F.R. § 106.37(c). For example, if 55% of the student athletes are men, male 
athletes should receive 55% of the available financial assistance for athletics. BONNETrE & 
DANIEL, supra note 42, at 15. 
47. 	 Bonnette and Daniel note: 
Unequal aggregate expenditures for members of each sex or unequal 
expenditures for male and female teams if a recipient operates or sponsors 
separate teams will not constitute noncompliance with this section, but the 
Assistant Secretary may consider the failure to provide necessary funds for teams 
for one sex in assessing equality of opportunity for members of each sex. 
BONNETrE & DANIEL, supra note 42, at 15. Moreover, "identical benefits, opportunities, or 
treatment are not required, provided the overall effect of any difference is negligible" or 
attributable to "unique aspects of particular sports" or "sex neutral factors." 1979 Policy 
Interpretation, supra note 9, at 71,415. 
48. 1979 Policy Interpretation, supra note 9, at 71,417 (quoting the implementing 
regulation currently codified at 34 C.F.R. § 106.41 (c) (1)). 
49. Allowing for the possibility that at some institutions men may have disproportionately 
fewer athletic opportunities than women, the 1979 Policy Interpretation refers not to women 
but to the "underrepresented" sex. 1979 Policy Interpretation, supra note 9, at 71,418. But OCR 
acknowledges that "participation in college sports has historically been emphasized for men but 
not women," which has "contributed to existing differences in the number of sports and scope 
of competition for men and women"-the number of opportunities for men outweighing 
opportunities for women. Id. at 71,419. Therefore, for simplicity, I will refer to "women" instead 
of the more cumbersome "underrepresented sex" when describing the elements of the three-
prong test. 
50. 1979 Policy Interpretation, supranote 9. 
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While OCR has repeatedly emphasized that institutions enjoy flexibility 
in measuring compliance by any one of three options,5' institutions have 
generally found compliance under prongs one and two to be increasingly 
difficult to attain. Several decades since the Policy Interpretation's 
inception, 2 the option of complying with prong two by demonstrating both 
a history and a continuing practice of expanding programs has become 
difficult, if not impossible. 3 As for prong one, increases in women's overall 
college enrollment set the compliance bar ever higher.54 And budget 
shortfalls that compel universities to eliminate athletic opportunities rather 
than add them cause many to associate proportionality compliance with cuts 
to men's sports that do not generate revenue, further decreasing the 
desirability of prong one. 55 
The third prong thus became the focal point for many institutions' 
compliance efforts, and as such, has been the subject of OCR's subsequent 
clarifications. In 1996, OCR explained that it would determine whether an 
institution complied with the third prong by considering whether there is 
"unmet interest" among female students in a particular sport and whether 
the institution would be able to "sustain a team" of female participants that 
would enjoy "a reasonable expectation of competition. ,,56 In terms of 
measuring "unmet interest," OCR would look at indicators such as: 
0 requests by students and admitted students that a particular 
sport be added; 
51. 1996 CLARIFICATION, supra note 15; 2003 CLARIFICATION, supra note 20; 2005 
CLARIFICATION, supranote 20, at 3. 
52. Moreover, for a period of time between 1984 and 1989, after the Supreme Court held 
that Tide IX did not apply to components of education programs, like athletics, that did not 
directly receive federal funding, and before Congress clarified the statute to negate that 
interpretation, see supranote 3, university athletic departments had no Title IX obligations that 
would have compelled them to add programs. 
53. See, e.g., George, supranote 32, at 1118; Yuracko, supranote 15, at 741. Moreover, any 
school that truly did so for thirty years would probably satisfy substantial proportionality 
compliance. Of the 130 institutions that OCR reviewed between 1992 and 2002, only eight 
attempted to comply under prong two, in comparison to the eighty-six that attempted to 
comply under prong three and the thirty-six that satisfied prong one. NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. 
STATISTICS, USER'S GUIDE TO DEVELOPING STUDENT INTEREST SURVEYS UNDER TITLE IX 3 (Mar. 
2005) [hereinafter USER'S GUIDE]. 
54. FEDER, supra note 33, at 8 (noting that women's enrollment in post-secondary 
institutions rose 30% between 1981 and 1999); COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 6, at 13 (stating 
that women's enrollment as college undergraduates-measured at 56% in 1997-exceeds 
men's enrollment). 
55. See, e.g., Martha Burk & Natasha Plumly, Who Owns Sports? The Politics of Title IX, 14 
MARQ. SPORTS L. J. 49, 51 (2003); see also Orleans, supra note 19, at 132 (describing the "rift" 
that develops between male and female student athletes "as each group is told, or comes to 
believe, that its opportunities must be limited in order to increase those of the other group"). 
56. 1996 CLARIFICATION, supra note 15. The 1996 Clarification also addressed prong-one 
compliance by declining to require exact proportionality, emphasizing a case- and fact-specific 
approach over "strict numerical formulas or 'cookie cutter' answers." Id 
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* 	 requests that an existing club sport be elevated to 
intercollegiate team status; 
* 	 participation in particular club or intramural sports; 
* 	 interviews with students, admitted students, coaches, 
administrators, and others regarding interest in particular 
sports; 
* 	 results of questionnaires of student and admitted students 
regarding interests in particular sports; . . .participation in 
particular [] interscholastic sports by admitted students [;and] 
* 	 participation rates in sports in high schools, amateur athletic 
associations, and community sports leagues that operate in 
57areas from which the institution draws its students .... 
Nonetheless, dissatisfaction with prong three persisted, along with 
rhetoric of confusion about what Title IX compliance entails. 5 Because 
OCR's multifactor approach measured compliance under prong three based 
on qualitative, subjective factors, institutions claimed to be uncertain of 
whether their athletic programs satisfied OCR's test,
5
or more importantly, 
9whether they could be successfully defended in court.
Also, several federal appellate courts consider the elimination of an 
existing, viable women's team to be defacto evidence of "unmet interest" and 
noncompliance with prong three. 6 For example, in Cohen v. Brown 
University,61 the First Circuit rejected a university's attempt to eliminate two 
men's and two women's teams at the same time.62 This seemingly even­
57. Id. Factors are similar to OCR's internal manual for investigators. See BONNETrE & 
DANIEL, supra note 42, at 24-27. In addition, the 1979 Policy Interpretation, supra note 9, 
afforded flexibility to institutions, allowing them to gauge interest level by any method of their 
choosing, provided: 
(a) The processes take into account the nationally increasing levels of women's 
interests and abilities; 
(b) The methods of determining interest and ability do not disadvantage the 
members of an underrepresented sex; 
(c) The methods of determining ability take into account team performance 
records; and 
(d) The methods are responsive to the expressed interests of students capable of 
intercollegiate competition who are members of an underrepresented sex. 
58. 	 COMMISSION REPORT, supranote 6, at 25-26. 
59. 	 Id. at 23-24. 
60. Kelley v. Bd. of Trs., Univ. of Ill., 35 F.3d 256, 269-70 (7th Cir. 1994) (explaining that 
the University of Illinois could not eliminate the women's swim team without violating prong 
three, because "women with a demonstrated interest in an intercollegiate athletic activity and 
demonstrated ability to compete at the intercollegiate level would be left without an 
opportunity to participate in their sport"); Roberts v. Colo.State Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824, 
832 (10th Cir. 1993); Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888,904 (1st Cir. 1993). 
61. 	 Cohen 1,991 F.2d at 906. 
62. 	 Id. 
91 IOWA LAWREVIEW (2006] 
handed attempt to reduce athletic expenditures rendered Brown 
noncompliant with prong three. The court recognized that a school cannot 
cancel a "healthy" women's team and still claim to "fully and effectively 
accommodate" women's interests and abilities in athletics. 6 1 Since Cohen, 
prong three ensures that at institutions failing the proportionality test under 
prong one, existing women's sports teams are protected from elimination in 
a way that men's sports teams are not.64 This interpretation fueled criticism 
that the three-prong test, rather than universities' disparate distribution of 
athletic opportunities or the financial constraints forcing them to cut teams,
65
 
was responsible for cuts in men's sports.
 
C. THE COMMISSION ON OPPORTUNITY INATHLETICS 
In response to this controversy, the Department of Education decided 
in 2002 to charge a commission to study Title IX's athletics regulations and 
policy with an eye toward reform. The Commission heard both expert and 
lay testimony at open town hall meetings in several cities across the United 
States.6 6 It also received comments by letter, telephone, and e-mail. 67 The 
Commission released its report with recommendations and findings in 
February 2003.68 The Commission's work was significant for two reasons. 
First, it provided a formal, quasi-regulatory forum for debates over many 
controversial aspects of Title IX's application to college and university 
athletics. Second, its recommendations regarding interest surveys ultimately 
resulted in OCR's adoption of that methodology for measuring compliance 
with prong three in 2005. 
The Commission heard arguments that Title IX is an affirmative action 
quota that caps or eliminates opportunities for men. 69 These arguments 
ranged from the emotional and sentimental-cries of "Let our sons 
play[!]" 7 -- to the statistical-reports of numbers and percentages of 
women's overall gains and men's overall losses in athletic opportunity in the 
age of Title IX.7 1 Many critics blamed the elimination of men's teams, such 
63. Id. 
64. Id. 
65. COMMISSION REPORT, supranote 6, at 24. 
66. Id. at 4. 
67. Id. 
68. Id.at 1. 
69. Id. at 24. 
70. COMMISSION REPORT, supranote 6, at 8. 
71. Id. at 19 (showing that men's teams were discontinued more often than women's in 
the 1990s). However, more recent data suggest that the trend of losses in men's sports is 
changing direction. Welch Suggs, Gender Quotas?Not in College Sports, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., 
July 1, 2005, at A24 [hereinafter Suggs, Gender Quotas] (reporting that the Department of 
Education's most recent data show the total number of male athletes increasing "by about 2,700 
between 2002-3 and 2003-4, and the number of men's teams either increased or remained 
steady across all divisions"). 
SURVEY SAYS... 
as wrestling, track and field, swimming and diving, and baseball, on 
institutions' efforts to attain proportionality and avail themselves of the "safe 
harbor" from lawsuits. 72 In its report, the Commission acknowledged that 
the burdensome proportionality test under prong one has been a factor in 
universities' decisions to cut or cap teams. 7 While noting that "[flacility 
limitations and budgetary concerns" also influence these decisions, the 
Commission recognized that institutions "cannot ignore the potential effect 
of their decision on Title IX compliance" and apparently fear "litigation if 
[they] cut[] a women's team without being in compliance with the 
proportionality test."7" 
The Commission's published report includes twenty-three 
recommendations, fifteen of which received the Commissioners' unanimous 
approval.7 5 These unanimously approved recommendations were "rather 
benign in nature and merely call [ed] for clarity and consistency in Title IX 
enforcement by OCR."76 For instance, the Commission recommended that 
OCR "make clear that/. cutting teams,,77in order to o/ demonstrate compliance• 

with Title IX is a disfavored practice. 
In contrast, other recommendations garnered dissent among the 
commissioners and compelled two to refuse to sign on to the report.7s Some 
of these recommendations modified prong one so as to reduce the 
difference between universities' existing offerings and a proportional 
distribution of athletic opportunities for women. For example, the 
Commission recommended that institutions be allowed to exclude 
"nontraditional , 9 students from the general student population.80 This 
recommendation was controversial because women are "disproportionately 
likely to be the 'non-traditional' older students excluded under this 
proposal.". Thus, excluding them from the student population reduces the 
percentage of female students counted for compliance purposes and, in 
72. COMMISSION REPORT, supranote 6, at 23. 
73. Id. at 24. 
74. Id. at 24-25. 
75. Id. at 59-60. 
76. Lisa Yonka Stevens, Note, The Sport of Numbers: Manipulating Title IX to Rationalize 
DiscriminationAgainst Women, 2004 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 155, 170; see also COMMISSION REPORT, 
supranote 6, at 33-40 (setting forth the recommendations). 
77. COMMISSION REPORT, supranote 6, at 34 (recommendation five). 
78. These Commissioners published their minority views in a separate report. See generally 
JULIE FOUDY & DONNA DE VARONA, MINORITY VIEWS ON THE REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON 
OPPORTUNITY IN ATHLETICS (Feb. 26, 2003) [hereinafter MINORITY REPORT], available at 
http://womenssportsfoundation.org/cgi-bin/iowa/issues/rights/articles.html?record=944. 
79. Nontraditional students are those "not between the ages of 18 and 24 and students of 
any age who have children." MINORITY REPORT, supra note 78, at 14. 
80. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 6, at 39 (recommendation twenty). 
81. MINORITY REPORT, supra note 78, at 14. 
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turn, the percentage of female student athletes a university must have to 
attain proportionality under prong one. 
Another controversial recommendation would let institutions count 
unfilled roster spots as actual student athletes, raising concerns that 
universities could attain proportionality under prong one on the backs of 
potential rather than actual female athletes. 82 These recommendations and 
others appeared to the dissenting commissioners to weaken Title IX's 
protection against discrimination by undermining proportionality 
compliance. 3 
The Commission also recommended that OCR consider allowing 
institutions to rely on the results of surveys gauging whether an institution's 
athletic offerings satisfy its female students' interests and abilities.84 
Redefining compliance under prong three as a proportion between the ratio 
of male and female athletes to the ratio of male and female students who 
express an interest in athletics would provide institutions with a 
"quantifiable way of demonstrating compliance. A minority of 
commissioners feared that this manner of compliance would "prevent future 
progress in providing opportunities for women" because it failed to 
acknowledge either the causal effect that opportunity has on interest levels 
or the historical patterns of discrimination against women's interest in 
athletics. 86 In a separate, independent report, the two dissenting 
commissioners argued: 
Using interest surveys is a way to force girls and women to prove 
their right to equal opportunity before giving them a chance to 
play. The proposal rests on the stereotyped notion that women are 
inherently less interested in sports than men-a notion that 
contradicts Title IX and fundamental principles of civil rights law.87 
82. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 6, at 37 (recommendation fifteen). The objection 
here is obvious: Schools could comply with Title IX without having to ensure that actual women 
fill their theoretical participation rates. MINORIY REPORT, supranote 78, at 13. Moreover, the 
minority Commissioners found it particularly troubling for a school that spends 112% more 
recruiting men than women-and that then, as a result, has fewer women participating on its 
women's teams-to be able to claim credit for providing a "predetermined" hypothetical 
number of opportunities regardless of whether those opportunities are filled by actual student 
athletes. Id 
83. MINORTY REPORT, supranote 78, at 1. 
84. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 6, at 38-39 (recommendations eighteen and 
nineteen). 
85. Id. at 38. 
86. Id. 
87. MINORITY REPORT, supranote 78, at 16. 
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II. THE MODEL SURVEY AND ITS CONTROVERSIAL METHODOLOGY 
At first, the Department of Education refrained from adopting any of 
the Commission's recommendations."" In 2005, however,8 9 OCR announced 
a new clarification of the three-prong compliance policy. Consistent with the 
Commission's recommendation, the newly clarified policy allows institutions 
to demonstrate compliance with the third prong by relying on the results of 
a survey of enrolled students' interests and abilities in athletics.90 The 2005 
Clarification provides detailed instructions for assessing students' interest 
using a Web-based "Model Survey" developed by the National Center for 
Education Statistics. 91 An institution that administers the survey according to 
OCR's instructions enjoys the presumption of prong-three compliance when 
survey results indicate lack of interest sufficient to sustain additional female 
varsity teams. 92 To be clear, OCR does not require institutions to administer 
the Model Survey or any survey to demonstrate compliance with the third 
prong. Further, no institution is required to use the third prong at all. 
However, it is reasonable to expect, given the unpopularity of prong-one 
proportionality compliance, that institutions will select prong three, the 
88. After the Commission Report's release, women's sports advocates held their collective 
breath expecting the Department of Education to adopt many of the controversial 
recommendations. But they exhaled a sigh of relief when, five months later, OCR issued a 
"clarification letter" that merely reiterated the alternative nature of the three prongs, reminded 
institutions that nothing in Title IX requires them to eliminate men's teams, and pledged to 
"aggressively enforce Title IX standards." 2003 CLARIFICATION, supra note 20, at 2-3; see also 
Stevens, supra note 76, at 156 (pointing out that the Department of Education could adopt any 
of these recommendations at any time in the future). 
89. See Christine Brennan, E-Mail Surveys May Be FirstStep in Effort to Cripple Progressof Title 
IX, USA TODAY, Mar. 24, 2005, at 8C (suggesting that the Department of Education deliberately 
waited out the intervening election before announcing this unpopular change). 
90. 2005 CLARIFICATION, supra note 20, at iv. Recall OCR's 1996 Clarification of the third 
prong: 
An institution is in compliance with the third prong so long as there is no sport for 
which, with respect to the underrepresented sex, there is unmet interest and ability 
to sustain an intercollegiate team that would have a reasonable expectation of 
competition. If there is a sport for which those conditions are met, the institution 
must either provide that sport or show that it is meeting the interests and abilities 
of the underrepresented sex. 
1996 CLARIFICATION, supranote 15. 
91. NCES developed a User's Guide to Developing Student Interest Surveys Under Title IX, supra 
note 53, which was released with the Policy Clarification, along with a Technical Manual for 
Developing the User's Guide that was generated by the National Institution of Statistical Sciences. 
See generally NAT'L INST. OF STATISTICAL SCIENCES, TECHNICAL MANUAL FOR DEVELOPING THE 
USER'S GUIDE (2005) [hereinafter TECHNICAL MANUAL]. 
92. 2005 CLARIFICATION, supranote 20, at 7. The presumption can be overcome "if OCR 
finds direct and very persuasive evidence of unmet interest sufficient to sustain a varsity team 
such as the recent elimination of a viable varsity team" or a recent petition to elevate a club 
sport to varsity status. Id. Institutions may not use the failure to express interest during a survey 
as grounds to eliminate a current and viable intercollegiate team. Id. 
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compliance option that requires less expense and effort. As this Part 
demonstrates, the Model Survey's design virtually guarantees that the 
responses of interest and ability will not be sufficient to compel a university 
to add teams for women. 
This Part will first demonstrate how a student may be invited to 
participate in a Model Survey. It will then provide a critique of the Model 
Survey, listing the various reasons why the Model Survey is an inadequate 
method of complying with the requirements of Title IX. 
A. A STUDENT TAKES THEMODEL SURVEY 
A hypothetical university student might be invited to participate in the 
Model Survey by an e-mail






Date: September 1, 2006
 
Subject: Athletic interest survey
 
DearStudent, 
In an effort to determine whether our current offerings of intercollegiate, 
club, and intramuralathletics meet the athletic interests and abilitiesof our 
students, we are asking allfemale95 students to participatein a ten-minute, 
confidentialsurvey. 
First, the survey will ask for your demographic information, such as age, 
gender,year in school, and whetheryou are afull- orpart-time student. You 
will then be asked to provide information about your athletic experience, 
current participation in athletic activities, and interest in future 
participationin athleticactivities. 
If you do not respond to the survey, we will infer thatyou are not interested
S•• 96 
in participatingin athleticactzvztzes. 
93. OCR expressly suggests e-mails linking to the Model Survey Web site as an appropriate 
method of inviting students' participation. 2005 CLARIFICATION, supranote 20, at 7. 
94. OCR does not mandate e-mail text that educational institutions must use to distribute 
Web links to the survey. I have based the text of this hypothetical e-mail largely on the text 
contained in the first screen of the Model Survey, see TECHNICAL MANUAL, supranote 91, at 7; 
2005 CLARIFICATION, supranote 20, at 6. 
95. An institution could instead choose to survey every full-time undergraduate rather 
than just the women, and OCR notes that "ideally [the survey] will be administered to members 
of both sexes." 2005 CLARIFICATION, supranote 20, at 6. Under either approach, sampling is not 
permitted. Id. 
96. OCR expressly provides that institutions may assume that a nonresponse indicates an 
actual lack of interest, as long as all students have been given an easy opportunity to respond, 
and the purpose of the survey (and the consequence of a nonresponse) has been made clear. 
Id. 
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Pleaseclick on the Web link below to begin the survey. 
Thank youforyour cooperation, 
The Administration 
A student who links to the survey Web page will click her way through a 
couple of preliminary screens-including one giving her the option to 
bypass the rest of the survey altogether by giving a blanket "not interested in 
athletics" response-and then arrive at a list of sports. The list contains all 
NCAA-recognized varsity sports,97 including designated "emerging sports." 8 
From this list of thirty, the student is invited to check as many as she wants to 
provide information about her past, present, and intended future 
participation. The next screen brings up a grid: one row for each of the 
sports she selected on the previous screen and one column for each of the 
following four questions: 
1. 	 At what level did you participate in this sport in high school: 
Recreational, Intramural, Club, Junior Varsity, or Varsity? 
2. 	 At what level are you participating in this sport at this university: 
Recreational, Intramural, Club, or Intercollegiate? 
3. 	 At what level do you wish to participate in this sport at this 
university: Recreational, Intramural, Club, or Intercollegiate? 
4. 	 Do you believe that you have the ability to participate at the 
level in which you indicated interest: Yes, I have the ability, or 
No, I would have to develop the ability?99 
After the student answers each of these four questions for as many 
sports as she selected, the Web site displays a page that allows her to provide 
additional comments or feedback. It also informs her that she may use the 
survey form to request that the university's athletic department contact her 
about her reported interest in athletics. 
B. CRITIQUE OF THE MODEL SURVEY 
OCR's decision to allow Model Survey results to create a presumption of 
compliance with prong three has been publicly criticized by the NCAA,'00 
97. If the surveying institution is not a member of the NCAA, the list would include the 
varsity sports recognized by the national intercollegiate athletic association to which the school 
belongs--either the National Association of Intercollegiate Athletics or the National Junior 
College Athletic Association. Id. at 7 n.13. 
98. NCAA lists the following emerging sports for women: archery, badminton, bowling, 
equestrian, rugby, squash, synchronized swimming, and team handball. NCAA, Emerging 
Sports for Women, available at http://wwwl.ncaa.org/membership/membership.svcs/ 
emerging-sports/home.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2006). 
99. TECHNICAL MANUAL, supra note 91, at 62. 
100. Press Release, NCAA, NCAA Leadership Groups Urge Department of Education to 
Rescind Additional Clarification for Title IX and Maintain 1996 Clarification (Apr. 28, 2005), 
available at http://www2.ncaa.org/media.and events/pressroom/2005/april/20050428­
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0 2newspaper editorials,0 1 advocacy groups, more than 140 members of 
0 3 Congress,' and even a Hollywood actor. 10 4 Opponents maintain that the 
survey's flawed methodology virtually guarantees that a school relying on the 
results will rarely have to increase women's sports opportunities.'0 5 Critics 
have also objected to OCR's failure to seek public comment on the Model 
Survey and have argued that the 2005 Clarification is inconsistent with 
federal court decisions rejecting survey evidence to demonstrate compliance 
with Title IX.106 
As explained in more detail below, the Model Survey's major problems 
are as follows. First, the time and manner of survey distribution may give rise 
to reasons other than lack of interest that a student would fail to respond, 
yet the 2005 Clarification allows institutions to count each passive 
nonresponse as a conscious vote of no interest. Second, the Model Survey's 
target population of currently enrolled students is problematic because it 
ignores the highly relevant population of interested and capable female 
student athletes who would have enrolled, or whom the school would have 
been able to recruit, had the school offered the sport of their choice. Third, 
the Model Survey gives controlling weight to respondents' self-assessment of 
their own athletic ability and provides response options that are slanted in a 
way that is likely to underreport ability. 
titleix.resolution.html (announcing an NCAA Executive Commission resolution urging OCR to 
rescind the policy and urging NCAA member institutions to decline the use of interest surveys). 
101. See, e.g., Editorial, A New Attack on Women's Sports, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 2005, at A20; 
Editorial, Too Lax on Title IX WASH. POST, Apr. 2, 2005, at A20. 
102. See Letter from Lisa M. Maatz &Jocelyn Samuels, Nat'l Coal. for Women and Girls in 
Educ., to Margaret Spellings, U.S. Secretary of Educ. (Mar. 28, 2005), available at 
http://www.ncwge.org/documents/NCWGE.spellings.ltr.final/pdf; DON SABO & CHRISTINE 
H.B. GRANT, CTR. FOR RES. ON PHYSICAL ACTIVITY, SPORT & HEALTH, LIMITATIONS OF THE 
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION'S ONLINE SURVEY METHOD FOR MEASURING ATHLETIC INTEREST AND 
ABILITY ON U.S.A. CAMPUSES (June 2005), available at www.dyc.edu/crpash/ 
limits-of_onlinesurvey.pdf; WOMEN'S SPORTS FOUND., DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION CREATES 
HUGE TITLE IX COMPLIANCE LOOPHOLE: THE FOUNDATION POSITION (June 16, 2005) 
[hereinafter WOMEN'S SPORTS FOUND., COMPLIANCE LOOPHOLE], available at http:// 
www.womenssportsfoundation.org/cgi-bin/iowa/issues/rights/article.html? record= 1009. See 
generally Save Title IX, http://www.SaveTitlelX.org (last visited March 10, 2006). 
103. See Press Release, Congresswoman Nancy Pelosi, Pelosi Recognizes the 33rd 
Anniversary of Title IX and the Opportunities Provided to Young Girls (June 22, 2005), available 
at http://www.house.gov/pelosi/press/releases/June05/TitlelX.html (including the text of a 
letter sent from House Democratic Leader Nancy Pelosi and more than 140 other House 
Democrats to President George W. Bush). 
104. "1am here to take you on a short ride in Thelma and Louise's car if you think it's fair 
and just to limit a girl's opportunity to play sports based on her response to an interest survey." 
COMMISSION REPORT, supranote 6, at 8 (quoting Geena Davis, "actress and amateur archer"). 
105. See, e.g., WOMEN'S SPORTS FOUND., COMPLIANCE LOOPHOLE, supra note 102 (calling the 




Fourth, under the 2005 Clarification, institutions can use the Model 
Survey's results to determine the nature and number of participation 
opportunities it must offer to comply with Title IX. Social scientists, 
advocates, and the courts have recognized that opportunity, combined with 
other social forces, generates interest.10 7 As a result, the Model Survey results 
are likely to merely reflect and reinforce the status quo in which women's 
athletic opportunities are disproportionately lower than men's. 
An overarching critique levied by the Model Survey's opponents also 
bears mention. Because OCR did not invite public comment before 
announcing the 2005 Clarification,'08 there is no way to know whether OCR 
or its contractors considered any of these problems when developing and 
adopting the Model Survey.'09 
1. Nonresponse Counts as Lack of Interest 
The Model Survey allows universities to treat nonresponse as evidence 
of lack of interest so long as universities give students the opportunity to 
respond to the survey, explain the purpose of the survey, and inform 
students that they will consider nonresponse evidence of lack of interest."l 0 
With these conditions satisfied, an institution can infer lack of interest from 
nonresponse, which OCR frankly acknowledges "may be high with the e-mail 
procedure.""' 
In essence, the Model Survey allows universities to infer that a student's 
nonresponse has significance and meaning-that it reflects a deliberate and 
informed choice to waive the opportunity to respond affirmatively with 
interest. In actuality, there is no way to know whether this is the case, or 
whether other factors, particularly those associated with the manner in 
which the Model Survey is distributed, explain the student's nonresponse. 
This subpart explores some factors that are not associated with a student's 
lack of interest that may cause her not to respond to the Model Survey. 
"I didn't check my e-mail" College students spend more time online than 
any other segment of the population. Most of them check their e-mail 
107. See, e.g., SABO & GRANT, supra note 102, at 2-3; infraParts III.A.5 & III.B. 
108. This decision to release a 100+ page "clarification" (including the Technical Manual 
and User's Guide) without giving public notice or opportunity to comment defies the 
Commission's recommendation that OCR make any future substantive adjustments to its 
enforcement policy "through the normal federal rulemaking process." COMMISSION REPORT, 
supra note 6, at 33 (recommendation two). 
109. WOMEN'S SPORTS FOUND., COMPLIANCE LOOPHOLE, supra note 102. 
110. USER'S GUIDE, supranote 53, at 12. 
111. 2005 CLARIFICATION, supranote 20, at 7. 
112. The Pew Internet & American Life Project reports that 86% of college students are 
online. STEVE JONES ET AL., PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT, THE INTERNET GOES TO 
COLLEGE: HOW STUDENTS ARE LIVING IN THE FUTURE WITH TODAY'S TECHNOLOGY 2 (2002), 
availableat http://www.pewinternet.org/pdfs/PIPcollege-report.pdf. 
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frequently."3 Yet there is documented variation in the degree to which 
college students use the Internet, including variation based on race and 
class."14 Therefore, some students do not use the Internet regularly enough 
for e-mail to be a reliable means of obtaining their participation in a survey. 
Even though these students are likely to be a small fraction of the 
undergraduate population as a whole, their lack of participation may be 
significant. Collegiate women's sports teams frequently have fewer than 
twenty players." 5 In that context, the difference between a university's 
decision that there is sufficient interest and ability to sustain a viable 
women's team in a particular sport could come down to the difference 
between twelve students responding with interest and fifteen students 
responding with interest." 6 When the number of "swing" students is that 
low, even a small minority of students who do not respond for whatever 
reason has the potential to affect the survey's results in a legally significant 
way. 
"I check e-mail, but not that account." Even among the high percentage of 
students who use e-mail frequently, universities cannot be sure which e-mail 
accounts they are using. Students might sign up for a commercial e-mail 
account to use in addition to or instead of their college-provided e-mail 
account. These students may check university accounts too infrequently to 
timely respond to the Model Survey e-mail or e-mails following up with the 
student's nonresponse. With free commercial e-mail accounts offering larger 
inbox capacities, better reliability, and more effective technology for 
blocking unsolicited mass e-mail or "spain,"" students have many reasons to 
rely more heavily on a non-university account. 
113. Seventy-two percent of students check their e-mail once a day. Id. Two-thirds have 
more than one e-mail account. Id. 
114. Kathleen Korgen et al., Internet Use Among College Students: Are There Differences by 
Race/Ethnicity?, 5 ELECTRONICJ. SOC. (Mar. 2001) (providing statistical evidence of the "gap in 
Internet use among the major racial and ethnic groups in the United States" and concluding 
that the digital divide is "alive and well at colleges and universities, even when virtually all 
college campuses now have Internet access for students"). 
115. For example, at the University of Iowa, women's teams in softball (18), volleyball (14), 
basketball (15), field hockey (16), golf (8), cross country (18), gymnastics (13), and tennis (7) 
all have fewer than twenty players. Only rowing (26), soccer (25), and swimming (23) have 
more than twenty. See generally University of Iowa, Official Athletic Site, 
http://hawkeyesports.com (last visitedJan. 19, 2006). 
116. OCR does not say how many interested players are necessary to require an institution 
to start a team (or club). In general, OCR will defer to the decisions of the athletic directors 
and coaches, so long as the number of players chosen has some basis in factors such as "average 
size of teams" in that sport, "rate of substitutions," variety of skills required, and "effective 
practices." 2005 CLARIFICATION, supranote 20, at 11. 
117. See Matthew Hicks, AOL Readies Web E-Mail Contender, EWEEK.COM (Dec. 22, 2004), 
http://www.eweek.com/article2/0,1759,1745129,00.asp (describing efforts by AOL, Yahoo, 
Google, and MSN to be competitive in the Web-based e-mail market); see also SABO & GRANT, 
supranote 102, at 4 (suggesting that "frequent disruptions or periodic shutdowns" of campus e-
mail services can contribute to students' use of alternative commercial e-mail accounts). 
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"My e-mail program thought it was spam." Commercial e-mail programs try 
to filter unsolicited "spain," blocking the messages or cordoning them into a 
separate folder. A conscientious student may route e-mail addressed to her 
university account to the commercial account inbox that she checks 
regularly, but that commercial account might interpret e-mail sent by the 
university to large lists of students as spare.1" 
"I'm a little busy right now." Although OCR suggests that e-mail is a 
permissible method to garner survey participation, it only requires that 
institutions use a method "designed to generate high response rates" that 
give students an "easy opportunity to respond."1 9 As an alternative to e-mail, 
a school might choose "to administer the Model Survey as part of the 
registration process whereby students must complete or actively bypass the 
Model Survey to register for courses."12 0 However, this method also has 
potential to generate less than full and careful participation in the survey. 
Students often race to register for limited slots in popular courses. When 
time is of the essence, even a student with genuine interest and ability to 
participate in athletics might select the general "not interested" response121 
to proceed with her course registration. A student's future opportunities to 
participate in athletics should not hinge on her understandable-indeed, 
commendable-decision to prioritize academics at that particular moment. 
"I thought you meant 'athletics.' " Even if students receive the e-mail 
inviting (or requiring) their participation in the Model Survey, some may 
avoid participation if they misconstrue the survey's purpose. Based on its 
title, a student could infer that an "Assessment of Students' Athletic Interests 
and Abilities" only concerns intercollegiate sports, to the exclusion of 
intramural and club sports, which are also part of the Model Survey's 
scope. The fact that many colleges administer intercollegiate athletics out 
of a department called "athletics" and intramurals and clubs out of a 
department called "recreation1 2 3 could contribute to this misimpression. 
Regardless of their interest in athletics, students who misperceive the nature 
of the survey (as well as those who are busy, attitudinally predisposed against 
cooperating with the administration, or pessimistically doubt that their 
118. My personal experience routing e-mail sent to my cornell.edu address to my 
yahoo.com address exemplifies this problem. E-mail from the university administration 
frequently ends up in my yahoo.com inbox's unmonitored "bulk mail" folder, presumably 
because, like spam, it is addressed to a long list of e-mail addresses. 
119. 2005 CLARIFICATION, supranote 20, at 6. 
120. Id. at 7. 
121. Id. 
122. SABO &GRANT, supranote 102, at 6. 
123. For example, the University of Iowa's Department of Recreation Services administers 
intramural and club sports separate from an Athletics Department reserved for intercollegiate 
sports. The University of New Hampshire's Department of Campus Recreation does the same. 
For a contrasting example, Cornell University has a single Department of Athletics and Physical 
Education that administers teams at all levels of competition. 
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response will make a difference) are unlikely to respond to the survey. Even 
if the university continues to solicit their participation under its obligation to 
"take[] reasonable steps to follow-up with students who do not respond," 2 4 
these students might reflexively select the blanket "not interested" response 
to avoid spending more time on a chore that they presume does not apply to 
them. 
2. The Target Population Is Illogical 
Under OCR's instructions, universities should only administer the 
Model Survey to enrolled, full-time undergraduates (either women or the 
entire student population). While this target population is sensible for 
measuring interest in intramural and club sports, the existing student body 
is not the population from which colleges and universities generally recruit 
for their intercollegiate teams. 25 
For a survey that aims to measure students' interests and abilities in 
sports that a university does not already offer, 12 6 already-enrolled students 
comprise an illogical target population. Common sense suggests that there is 
a negative correlation between a student's high interest and ability in a 
particular sport and the likelihood that she will enroll12 at a college that 
does not provide the opportunity to play at the level she would like. I2 1 As a 
result, survey results will only reflect the preferences of a population that is 
self-selected to be satisfied with the university's existing athletic offerings. 
124. 2005 CLARIFICATION, supranote 20, at 7. 
125. As the Commission acknowledged, there is no statistical data about the relative rates of 
recruited versus walk-on athletes. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 6, at 30. However, because 
most schools in NCAA Division I and II use athletic scholarships to recruit players, the number 
of scholarship players offers some indication of how prevalent recruiting is. According to the 
NCAA, more than 117,000 of 223,000 student-athletes at Division I and II institutions receive 
either partial or full athletic scholarships. See NCAA Membership Breakdown, http:// 
wwwl.ncaa.org/membership/membershipsvcs/membershipbreakdown.html (last visited Feb. 
24, 2006); NCAA, Undergraduate Athletic Scholarships, http://www.ncaa.org/about/ 
scholarships/school.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2006). In addition, while Division III schools 
(and the Ivy League in Division I) do not offer scholarships, they do recruit players. See NCAA, 
2005-2006 DIVISION III COACHES RECRUITING GUIDE (2005), available at http:// 
ncaa.org/library/membership/recruitingguides/2005-06/2005-06-d3-recruit-guide.pdf. 
126. To be clear, the Model Survey requires institutions to survey both about sports they 
offer and sports they do not. However, the survey's only real effect is on opportunities that do 
not exist; the survey results determine whether a university has to add them or whether it does 
not. 
127. Of course, factors like finances and geography limit students' agency in selecting a 
college. But the students with the most options are often those with the most interest and 
(especially) ability to play intercollegiate sports. 
128. Moreover, a theory of postdecisional cognitive dissonance reduction could explain 
why a student would not report any interest in a particular athletic opportunity that is not 
offered at the school she chose to attend. See SCOTr PLOUS, THE PSYCHOLOGY OFJUDGMENT AND 
DECISIONMAKING 28-29 (1993). 
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3. Self-Assessment Is Slanted 
After the Model Survey respondent selects the level of competition at 
which she would ideally like to play, the survey asks her whether she has the 
ability to play at that level or whether she would "have to develop the 
" 129  ability. • Social structures that antinormalize women's athletic• . 130 
participation make women less likely to consider themselves "athletes," 
with the confidence in physical skill that the label requires. 3 Women are 
likely to enter college with less prior athletic experience than men, making 
them more 
3 2
likely to underrate their ability even under optimal survey 
conditions. 
The Model Survey's response options further aggravate this problem. 
Any aspiring athlete with even a modicum of humility is not going to arrive 
at college assuming she already has what it takes to be competitive. She is 
going to assume that to participate on a competitive varsity team, she must 
pay her dues, work her way up, learn from the team veterans, and, in the 
words of the Model Survey, "develop the ability" to play at that level. The fact 
that university athletic teams routinely redshirt recruited players for a year 
suggests that these are reasonable assumptions. Model Survey results will 
thus underrepresent the number of interested athletes who believe they 
have the ability to eventually play at the level of competition to which they 
aspire. Survey results slanted in this way will further absolve universities with 
disproportionate athletic offerings from having to add additional 
opportunities for women at the highest-intercollegiate, varsity-level of 
competition. 
4. The Model Survey Measures Stereotypes, Not Actual Interest 
The Model Survey asks students to respond to questions about their 
interests and abilities. T3 As long as there are fewer students who express 
interest and ability in a particular sport than are necessary to sustain a team 
(at whatever level of competition), an institution can use the Model Survey 
results as evidence that its current offerings comply with Title IX. 
129. TECHNICAL MANUAL, supranote 91, at 62. 
130. See infra Part III(stating that the 2005 Clarification is a departure from structuralist 
equality reflected in Title IX). 
131. SABO & GRANT, supra note 102, at 2 (citing, for example, feminist legal scholar 
Catharine MacKinnon's reluctance to call herself an "athlete" notwithstanding her regular 
practice of tae kwon do). 
132. Id. at 3; WOMEN'S SPORTS FOUND., COMPLIANCE LOOPHOLE, supra note 102. 
133. A redshirted player practices with the team but does not play in competitions. A team 
will redshirt freshmen players to improve their skills, while preserving the next four years of 
NCAA eligibility. See NCAA, Student-Athlete Eligibility, http://www.ncaa.org/eligibility/faqs/ 
faqs.eligibilityseasons.html (last visitedJan. 19, 2005). 
134. TECHNICAL MANUAL, supranote 91, at 62. 
91 IOWA LAWREVIEW [2006] 
Critics predict that the survey results will simply serve as an echo 
chamber, "institutionaliz[ing] the very discrimination that is and has been 
the basis for women's lack of opportunity to participate in sports."13 5 The 
stereotype that women are less interested and less capable of participating in 
sports is what caused universities to offer disproportionately fewer female 
opportunities in the first place. Circularly, the fact that women have fewer 
opportunities to play competitive sports contributes to the stereotype that 
they are less interested in doing so. Therefore, the "true extent" of women's 
interests and abilities in athletics is obscured by the component of espoused 
interest that is socially constructed by stereotypes of women's interests. 3 7 As 
such, interest can neither be measured nor fairly employed as a benchmark 
for compliance. This criticism, which addresses the 2005 Clarification's most 
fundamental flaw, is the subject of a full analysis in the next Part. 
III. 	 2005 CLARIFICATION IS A DEPARTURE FROM STRUCTURALIST EQUALITY 
REFLECTED IN TITLE IX 
The Model Survey's critics are correct to argue that relying on survey 
responses to define the number of participation opportunities required 
under Title IX will only reinforce the existing disparity in athletic 
opportunities that institutions provide for men and women. For this 
argument to have legal relevance beyond merely classifying the 2005 
Clarification as a bad policy choice, this Part necessarily considers whether 
the 2005 Clarification is a departure from the theory of equality reflected in 
Title IX. 
Title IX demands women's inclusion in all aspects of federally funded 
education programs.138 It forbids the exclusion of women from participation 
and denial of benefits enjoyed by men. In that sense, Title IX reflects a 
formal equality theory that was dominant among liberal feminists in the 
1970s.13 9 The goal of formal equality is gender-neutral policies that allow 
women access to privileges on the same terms as men.1 40 Generally, though, 
formal equality accepts that an individual is entitled to equal treatment only 
to the extent she or he is similarly situated to a privileged group.' 4' In 
135. WOMEN'S SPORTS FOUND., COMPLIANCE LOOPHOLE, supranote 102. 
136. Id. 
137. SABo & GRANT, supranote 102, at 2. 
138. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (a) (2000). 
139. MARY JO FESTLE, PLAYING NICE: POLITICS AND APOLOGIES IN WOMEN'S SPORTS 111 
(1996). 
140. MICHAELJ. COZZILLIO & ROBERT L. HAYMANJR., SPORTS AND INEQUALITY 405 (2005). 
141. Deborah Brake, The Struggle for Sex Equality in Sport and the Theory Behind Title IX, 34 U. 
MICH.J.L. REFORM 13, 22, 25-26 (2000-2001); Vicki Shultz, Telling Stories About Women and Work: 
JudicialInterpretationsof Sex Segregationin the Workplace in Title VII Cases Raisingthe Lack of Interest 
Argument, 103 HARv. L. REv. 1749, 1806 (1990); Yuracko, supranote 15, at 734; Note, Cheeringon 
Women and Girls in Sports: Using Title IX to Fight Gender Role Oppression, 110 HARV. L. REv. 1627, 
1634 (1997) [hereinafter Note]. 
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determining whether an individual is so similarly situated, formal equality 
roots out sex stereotypes and eliminates them as the basis for different 
treatment. "Real" sex differences, however, are a permissible basis for
142 
different treatment. 
As applied to athletic participation, a model of formal equality would 
ensure that women who are interested in sports receive treatment similar to 
men who are interested in sports, so long as "interest in sports" is a genuine, 
innate sex difference. Therefore, formal equality requires consideration of 
whether men's and women's relative athletic preference is a natural, and 
thus permissible, basis for disparate treatment, or whether that gender 
difference is constructed by social structures. This Article refers to the latter
143 
as structuralism. 
The question of which gender differences are biological and which are 
constructed is not amenable to an easy answer. 14 Absent proof that athletic 
interest is innate, we must accept that traditional social structures that 
marginalize women's athletic participation are responsible-to some 
unquantifiable extent-for any reported lack of interest in athletics. When a 
university proffers survey evidence demonstrating women students' 
purported lack of interest to immunize its disproportionate athletic 
opportunities from legal challenge, as the 2005 Clarification allows, it retains 
its place among the social structures constructing that lack of interest in the 
first place. Thus, the 2005 Clarification renders Title IX useless as an 
antidiscrimination measure. 
This Part first describes the medical, social, educational, and legal 
structures that have effectively antinormalized women's participation in 
sports. Second, it suggests that Title IX has accounted for the social 
structures that operate to limit women's participation in sports. In 
particular, the language of the three-prong policy, bolstered by the federal 
appellate courts' interpretation, deliberately makes prong-three 
compliance-the only measure that looks at women's interests and 
abilities-a difficult and unstable measure of compliance. As the courts 
explain, this is because interest-defined compliance depends on socially 
constructed stereotypes, and not on women's actual interests. Because 
prong-two compliance, which examines history and continuing practice of 
program expansion, is equally unsustainable, 4 5 OCR and the courts had 
appropriately engineered a three-prong policy that actually has a 
proportionality-seeking effect. 
142. CozzILuo & HAYMAN, supranote 140, at 405 (defining structuralism and contrasting it 
with formal equality). 
143. Id. 
144. See Steven Pinker, Why NatureandNurture Won't Go Away, DAEDALUS, Fall 2004, at 5. 
145. See supranote 53 and accompanying text. 
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Third, this Part argues that the 2005 Clarification abandons Title IX's 
underlying structuralism in two related ways. First, in light of the cultural 
history described in Part III.A, a survey of women's interests in athletics is 
likely, to some unknowable degree, to measure women's responses to (or 
accommodation of) constructed antinormalization of women's athletic 
participation rather than some essential lack of desire to participate to the 
same extent as men. Moreover, it provides universities with an easier way to 
comply with Title IX's requirements than substantial proportionality. Prior 
to 2005, OCR and the federal courts had employed a structuralist rationale 
to make the third prong into a tough, unstable measure of compliance. By 
allowing reported interest levels to define equality, the 2005 Clarification 
strips the three-prong test of its power to push institutions toward 
proportionality, which had ensured that they could not get too comfortable 
with prong-three compliance. 
Finally, even if interest in athletics appropriately limits the class of men 
and women who are "similarly situated" for the purposes of achieving formal 
equality, OCR's new approach does not actually provide similar treatment to 
sports-interested women as to sports-interested men. Currently enrolled 
women must prove their interests and abilities in nonexistent opportunities 
to receive a proportionate share of athletic opportunities. In contrast, 
coaches and administrators will continue to recruit interested and capable 
male athletes to fill existing opportunities. The 2005 Clarification therefore 
fails, under any measure, as an anti-discrimination policy. 
A. THE ANTINORMALIZA TION OF WOMEN IN SPORTS 
History shows that our culture has been anything but gender neutral in 
its relationship to sports. The medical establishment, religious and moral 
views, educational values, and law have each contributed to the pervasive 
societal view of sports as a masculine realm. Within this context, women's 
participation in sports defies gender normativity. Women who do play sports 
exhibit apologetic or compensatory behavior, which helps demonstrate, and 
more importantly, perpetuate the idea that femininity and athletics are 
mutually exclusive. Even in our Title IX world, society sends women and 
girls clear and subtle signals that their participation in athletics is abnormal. 
In fact, Title IX, both the law itself as well as the backlash against it, 
contributes to this perception. This antinormalization suppresses women's 
athletic interest and participation. 
1. Medical and Moral Structures 
The muscular Christianity movement, imported from Europe in the 
mid-nineteenth century, introduced Americans to the idea that sports were 
integral to the development of men, who society worried were becoming too 
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effeminized by their increasing employment in white-collar jobs that did not 
require physical labor.146 Athletics, which developed "physical presence, stoic 
courage in the endurance of pain, and judgment under pressure," were 
deliberately touted as the antidote to this perceived weakness.14 7 In this 
context, participating in athletics was as much about defining what it means 
to be a man as what it means to be not a woman. Reclaiming masculinity 
through sports therefore required the exclusion of women. 
14
8 
Biological differences between men and women provided a more 
acceptable rationale for excluding women from sports. The medical 
establishment considered it unhealthy for women to exercise during 
menstruation and warned that those who did so put their prized fertility at 
risk.149 Other medical excuses, such as the theory that women were allocated 
a fixed amount of physical energy that had to be reserved for reproductive 
functions, also contributed to the biological basis for constructing the 
prevailing view that men's participation in sports was natural and women's 
was not.150 From the late 1800s through the 1940s, conventional medical 
advice warned that exercise, or too much exercise, put women at risk of 
uterine displacement, malformed breasts, and menstrual and childbirth 
complications. 5 1 These theories gave rise to the emerging-and enduring-
myth of female fragility. Though the medical establishment came to 
146. SUSAN K. CAHN, COMING ON STRONG: GENDER AND SEXUALITY IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY 
WOMEN'S SPORT 11 (1994); David Whitson, Sport in the Social Construction of Masculinity, in 
SPORT, MEN, AND THE GENDER ORDER: CRITICAL FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES 19, 21 (Michael A. 
Messner & Donald F. Sabo eds., 1990) [hereinafter SPORT, MEN, AND THE GENDER ORDER]. 
147. Whitson, supranote 146, at 21. 
148. FIELDS, supra note 35, at 154-55; Whitson, supra note 146, at 24 ("A proving ground 
for masculinity can only be preserved by the exclusion of women from the activity."). Catharine 
MacKinnon offers a different, though related, theory. See generally Catharine A. MacKinnon, 
Women, Self-Possession, and Sport (1982), in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE & LAW 
117 (1987). Like harassment, rape, and the relegation of women to the private sphere, 
excluding women from sports is another means of establishing-and perpetuating-women's 
subordinate status to men. Id. Because an athletic woman possesses physical power and strength 
and an awareness of body and self, she is less susceptible to men's dominance. Id. The 
construction of hegemonic masculinity of sport was no benign accident, but rather, it was an 
intentional rendering of women as accessible, passive, and "rapeable." Id. 
149. FIELDS, supra note 35, at 2; JENNIFER HARGREAVES, SPORTING FEMALES: CRITICAL ISSUES 
IN THE HISTORY AND SOCIOLOGY OF WOMEN'S SPORTS 43 (1994); HELEN LENSKYJ, OUT OF 
BOUNDS: WOMEN, SPORT AND SEXUALITY 25-27 (1986) (describing the "sacred" and "patriotic" 
status of motherhood that gave rise to such concerns). 
150. HARGREAVES, supra note 149, at 45. In contrast, it was believed that in men, athletic 
activity rejuvenated the body's energy reserves to aid the production of sperm. Todd Crosset, 
Masculinity, Sexuality and the Development of Early Modern Sport, in SPORT, MEN AND THE GENDER 
ORDER, supra note 146, at 52. 
151. LENSKYJ, supra note 149, at 20, 27-29. These concerns appeared to be limited to 
physical exertion on a recreational basis. The physical demands of housework did not give rise 
to similar threats. Id. at 29. 
152. Id. at 19-20. 
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accept that certain limited physical activity was acceptable and healthy for 
women, 5 3 medical arguments helped sustain the exclusion of women and 
girls from the more physical and aggressive sports for decades.
5 4 
Victorians isolated women from the exciting frenzy of sports in order to 
preserve their chastity.1 5 In the 1920s and 1930s, society criticized the 
bobbed-hair, boyish-looking flappers who began to challenge these 
restrictions as hypersexual. 56 Later, as society became increasingly aware-
and apprehensive-of its gay subculture, the fear that sports lead to sexual 
to sexual deviance.157 promiscuity was replaced by a fear that they lead 
Engaging in activity that embodied aggressiveness, competitiveness, and 
perseverance-values already appropriated as masculine-female athletes' 
perceived "mannishness" made them vulnerable to the charge of being, at 
best, unfeminine, and at worst, lesbians. I Neither charge was very good for15 
a woman's marriage prospects. 159 Both flew in the face of the Cult of True 
Womanhood, the dominant social view that as men's wage labor moved out 
of the home and into the public sphere, women's role was to remain in the 
home and raise the children. I6° Historian MaryJo Festle sums up the social 
forces deterring women's participation in sports in the early half of the 
twentieth century: "Conservative ideas about gender combined with sports' 
153. See id. at 24, 33. This realization was due, in large part, to the contributions of women 
in the medical field. Id. at 25-27. 
154. See, e.g., Magill v. Avonworth Baseball Conference, 364 F. Supp. 1212, 1216-17 (W.D. 
Pa. 1973) (denying an equal protection claim arising from a municipal baseball league's 
exclusion of girls as rationally related to medical and safety concerns); Suzanne Sangree, Title 
IX and the Contact SportsExemption: GenderStereotypes in a CivilRights Statute, 32 CONN. L. REv. 381, 
421-30 (2000) (describing the frailty rationale for the exclusion of women and girls from 
contact and noncontact sports). Medical beliefs, such as the perceived link between jumping 
and uterine displacement, also resulted in modified rules for girls' basketball. See LENSKYJ, supra 
note 149, at 28; infranotes 190-91 and accompanying text. 
155. See CAHN, supra note 146, at 165-66. The Victorians even feared the "undercurrent of 
sexual excitement" in the game of croquet. ALLEN GuTTMAN, WOMEN'S SPORTS: A HISTORY 119 
(1991). 
156. CAHN, supra note 146, at 165-66 (explaining that "[b]etween 1900 and 1930 the 
sexual debate in sport centered on the problem of unbridled heterosexual desire"). 
157. Id. at 164-68 (explaining that the derogatory term for female athletes of the day, 
'muscle moll," invoked an image of "promiscuous working-class sexuality" and prostitution). 
158. Id. at 164-66; FESTLE, supranote 139, at 22; LENSKYJ, supra note 149, at 74-76. 
159. GUTrMAN, supra note 155, at 95 ("Sports, however, were thought by many to spoil a 
girl's looks, to diminish her charm, and thus to hamper her in the all-important race to 
matrimony."); LENSKYJ, supranote 149, at 74 (describing how women who "lacked the feminine 
traits of emotionalism, passivity, and helplessness that validated masculine identity" were 
portrayed as "unappealing" to men). 
160. Sangree, supranote 154, at 402. The same social forces operated to encourage boys to 
play sports, which were believed to compensate for the feminizing effect of spending so much 
time with their mothers in the absence of their working fathers. Id,at 402-03. 
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historic association with masculinity in a powerful one-two punch knocking 
most women out of sports."'
16 
2. The Role of Women Physical Educators 
The physical education programs that colleges and universities 
developed in the early half of the twentieth century contributed to women's 
(and society's) attitudes about sports. Buoyed by the medical establishment's 
changing views on women's physical activity,162 female professional physical 
educators picked up the mantle and started implementing physical 
education curricula for their female students. Still, criticism that such efforts 
" "risked their [students'] modesty, mental health, and maternal capacity 161_ 
as well as the educators' own tenuous positions of power and influence'­• 165 
forced them to espouse a "moderated" athletics regimen for women. 
The women who controlled the physical education curricula at colleges 
and universities created programs for female students that were markedly 
different from the programs offered to male students. They promoted the 
ideal of a generalist "sportswoman," a woman who was reasonably competent 
in a variety of sports and games, rather than that of an "athlete" who 
specialized in one or few sports. 66 They emphasized companionship over 
competition and endeavored to protect women from exploitation. 67 These 
values were incompatible with varsity-type athletics programs that set rosters, 
regular practices, and a schedule of extramural play.6 
Instead, the educators favored intramural matchups, which were free 
from the public gaze, and the occasional extracurricular "play day" that 
mitigated competition by creating ad-hoc teams mixing women from the 
161. FESTLE, supra note 139, at 7. Given the context of this Article, it is worth noting that 
Festle cites the results of an interest survey administered by an Ohio State graduate student in 
1958. d. at 295 n.13. The most common reasons that the survey respondents gave for their 
reluctance to participate in sports "demonstrated their sensitivity to sports' unfeminine 
reputation:" muscles, masculinity, moral and ethical transgressions, bad taste, and societal 
disapproval. Id. 
162. CAHN, supra note 146, at 12 (explaining that doctors also came to believe that young 
women's exercise was good preparation for the physicality of childbearing); HARGREAVES, supra 
note 149, at 60 (noting that doctors began prescribing moderate exercise regimens for women 
after concluding that sedentary lifestyles were unhealthy). 
163. CAHN, supranote 146, at 22. 
164. As women, their status within the academy was lower than men's, and their field, 
physical education, did not enjoy the prestige of academic disciplines. FESTLE, supranote 139, at 
25. In light of their low status and the fact that they promoted behavior that was only
"marginally acceptable" for women, women physical educators' conservative philosophy can be 
interpreted as pragmatic self-preservation, d. Their jobs depended on their ability to ensure 
that their students portrayed a socially acceptable image. Id. 
165. CAHN, supranote 146, at 23. 
166. Id. at 64-65; FESTLE, supra note 139, at 12; GUTrMAN, supranote 155, at 139. 
167. FESTLE, supranote 139, at 11-12. 
168. Id. at 16. 
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different schools. 16 9 They also favored sports that society recognized as 
acceptable for women (especially educated, upper- and middle-class women) 
such as "country club" sports, which women could play with their future 
husbands. 170 These sports, like golf, tennis, swimming, and badminton, 
171 
were less sweaty and void of physical contact. 
In retrospect, it seems ironic and unfortunate that it was female physical 
educators who zealously implemented and defended a curriculum that 
demonstrably repressed women's athletic abilities and interest in 
"disfavored" sports.172 But as much as the educators' value choices 
contributed to a limited and qualified normative view of women and sports, 
these values were themselves a likely product of that normative view.' 73 The 
educators could not offer competitive varsity programs in team sports 
because their institutions did not budget enough money for uniforms, did 
not give them any equipment, gave men's teams priority in all practice fields
1 75 
and facilities, 174 and did not hire enough staff to coach women's teams.
The educators' generalist values and adamant intramural philosophy 
may have been a rationalization of the fact that they could not offer an 
alternative. 176 Their decision to favor companionate and non-exertive sports 
over competitive, physical, or contact sports may have been a pragmatic 
response to society's view of certain sports as unfeminine, a choice to protect 
the limited opportunities they could offer from backlash that would surely 
accompany a decision to push the envelope.' 77 Historian Mary Jo Festle 
surmises that the conservative philosophy of female physical educators, itself 
an "accommodation to prejudice against female athletes," perpetuated that 
very prejudice by reinforcing society's regard of a woman athlete as 
"inappropriate and unfeminine."' 78 She continues: "It fed more fuel to the 
cycle, begun in the late 1920s in which women chose not to aspire 




169. CAHN, supra note 146, at 66; FESTLE, supranote 139, at 15; GurTMAN, supra note 155, 
at 136-37, 140-41. 
170. FESTLE, supranote 139, at 11-12, 23. 
171. Id.at 11-12. Festle also reports that physical educators used women's responses to 
interest surveys to justify their decisions to de-emphasize sports like track and field. Id. at 11. 
The environment in which these women developed their sports preferences was adorned with 
posters warning women students: "'Don't Be a Muscle Moll.'" Id. at 22. 
172. Id. at 16-17. 
173. See id at 19. 
174. Id. At the University of North Carolina, for example, the only outdoor facility that was 
available for any women's team was the football field-the end zone only!-when no men's 
team was using it. Id. 
175. FESTLE, supranote 139, at 18-19. 
176. Id.at 19. 
177. Id. at 20-21. 




3. Modified Sports and Apologetic Behavior 
Notwithstanding the purported health risks, educators' early efforts to 
restrict women's opportunities in competitive and physical sports, and the 
widespread and growing belief that the "athletic woman" was oxymoronic, 
women did in fact play sports throughout the twentieth century.18 0 Schools, 
industrial leagues, and community leagues provided women and girls the 
chance to participate in basketball and track. The Amateur Athletic Union 
sponsored many women's tournaments, including track and field, 
swimming, gymnastics, basketball, and handball.18 There were even 
semiprofessional opportunities for women basketball and baseball players.182 
Opportunities at the college level also began to improve toward the end 
of the 1950s as the female physical educators embraced a more 
comprehensive and competitive sports curriculum-partially in response to 
social and political pressure attributable to the Cold War."" Nationalistic 
pride incited the drive to earn more medals than Russia at the 1956 and 
1960 Olympic Games, fueling a cultural acceptance and encouragement of 
female athletes. I1 4 The newly formed U.S. Olympic Development Committee 
and the President's Council on Youth sought to expand girls' and women's 
physical-education curricula to raise the general fitness level among 
women.18 5 The organizations also aimed to identify and support rising 
athletic stars. 186 This cultural shift compelled or freed female physical 
educators to endorse physical sports for women, including gymnastics, track 
and field, and basketball. 187 Eventually, the shift led educators to create an 
organization to sponsor intercollegiate tournaments. 188 
Yet even within these opportunities, women's participation was qualified 
in ways that reinforced the hegemonic masculinity of sports. First, even 
though women played and excelled in all kinds of sports, far fewer women 
did so than men."89 Also, some sports employed different rules for women 
180. FESTLE, supranote 139, at 32. 
181. GUTTMAN, supranote 155, at 138. 
182. CAHN, supra note 146, at 142-53 (describing the All-American Girls Professional 
Baseball League, which operated from 1943 through 1954); GUTTMAN, supra note 155, at 211­
12; MAX McELWAIN, THE ONLY DANCE IN IOWA: A HISTORY OF SIX-PLAYER GIRLS' BASKETBALL 
72-73, 121 (2004) (describing barnstorming semi-professional women's basketball teams). 
183. CAHN, supranote 146, at 130-31; FESTLE, supra note 139, at 94-97. 
184. FESTLE, supranote 139, at 89. 
185. Id. at 89-90. 
186. Id. 
187. Id. at 96. 
188. Id. The female physical educators did not share or espouse the government's goal of 
beating the Russians and continued to deemphasize the importance of winning. lI at 96-97. 
189. See, e.g., COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 6, at 12-13. The Commission acknowledged 
discriminatory practices in the pre-Title IX era that denied intercollegiate and interscholastic 
athletic opportunities to female students and resulted in much lower participation rates among 
women. Id. For example, in the 1966-1967 school year, 15,182 women competed in 
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that made the game less physical and virtually contact-free. Girls' basketball, 
for example, limited players to half- or third-court zones, though under 
some rules one player, a rover, could run the full court.' 90 Girls were limited 
in the number of times they could dribble before passing to a teammate. 
Fouling was more severely punished than in the boys' game. These 
modifications set the girls' game apart from the "regular" version of the 
game that boys played. In this way, girls' rules were both produced by and 
contributed to the idea that women were not fully capable athletes.' 9' 
Another difference between men's and women's sports was-and continues 
to be "-the lack of media coverage and public attention. 19 With some 
exceptions-rural Iowa, for example, where communities' enthusiasm and 
,194support for girls' high school basketball equaled or rivaled that for boys' ­
women's basketball, especially the adult amateur game, was not widely 
publicized. 195 Historians suggest that this silence suppressed participation by 
keeping women from finding out about opportunities to play, and it also 
contributed to the normative view that women were not athletes.'96 
In addition to having distinctly different participation rates, rules, and 
status in the popular culture, women's participation in sports is modified by 
its deference to "compulsory" norms of femininity and heterosexuality.' 9vTo 
dodge the lesbian epithet'9" and the related, constructed paradox of the 
intercollegiate sports, compared to 151,918 men. Id at 13. There was a similar ten-fold disparity 
in the gender breakdown of high school athletes in the early 1970s. Id. 
190. FESTLE, supranote 139, at 31-32; MCELWAIN, supranote 182, at 6. 
191. LENSKYJ, supranote 149, at 28. 
192. A recent study shows that the alarmingly low percentage of local news sports 
broadcasts devoted to women's sports fifteen years ago (about 5%) is not much higher (only 
about 6%) today. The study also reports a 20:1 ratio of men's to women's sports coverage on 
the national channel ESPN. The researchers also note occasional instances (though more rare 
than in previous studies) in which coverage of women's sports sexualized or trivialized women. 
MARGARET CARLISLE DUNCAN & MICHAEL A. MESSNER, GENDER IN TELEVISED SPORTS: NEWS AND 
HIGHLIGHTS SHOWS, 1989-2004, at 4-5 (July 2005), available at http://www.aafla.org/garr/ 
research reports/tv2004.pdf. 
193. FESTLE, supranote 139, at xxiv, 91-94. 
194. MCELWAIN, supranote 182, at 9. 
195. FESTLE, supranote 139, at 41-42. 
196. Id. at 53 ("According to sports pages, coaches, rulebooks, Library of Congress 
headings, and the popular mind, it was not 'basketball'-it was 'girls basketball.' The word 
basketball connoted boys' basketball, just as an athlete referred to a male unless otherwise 
qualified."). 
197. See generallyFESTLE, supra note 139, at 45-46; LENSKYJ, supranote 149, at 73-107. 
198. See generally PAT GRIFFIN, STRONG WOMEN, DEEP CLOSETS: LESBIANS AND HOMOPHOBIA 
IN SPORT 68-78 (1998) (describing women's sports' deliberate effort to promote a heterosexual 
and heterosexy image to negate lesbians' perceived and actual presence). For a recent, specific 
example of this phenomenon, see Complaint, Harris v. Portland, Civ. A. No. 05-2648 (M.D. Pa. 
Dec. 21, 2005).Jennifer Harris, a former Penn State basketball player, alleged that coach Rene 
Portland forced her off the team because Portland perceived that she is a lesbian. Complaint, 
supra,at 3, 12-20; see also Genaro C. Armas, PSUBasketball CoachDenies New Accusations, CENTRE 
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"woman athlete," 99 women in sports have been subject to, complied with, 
and promoted efforts to portray traditional female attributes like grace, 
beauty, and desire for men.200 State and national tournaments no longer 
include beauty pageants,2 ' and compulsory grooming and etiquette 
classes 02 have also fallen out of favor. But media coverage and organized 
promotion of women's sports continues to emphasize the ways in which 
female athletes demonstrate culturally accepted female attributes and 
behavior.' °3 Less subtly, female athletes who do not conform to the feminine 
DAILY TIMES, Nov. 10, 2005, at BI (quoting Harris as charging that Portland "continually 
harassed me to change my appearance and my image because she thought I was not 'feminine' 
enough"). Portland claims that her decision to dismiss Harris was a "basketball decision," 
Armas, supra, at BI, even though Harris started in twenty-two of thirty games in the 2004-2005 
season and had the highest scoring record among the players on the team who were eligible to 
return in the 2005-06 season. Complaint, supra,at 22-23. Portland has long been renowned for 
her negative recruiting tactics and anti-lesbian policy. See Bill Figel, Lesbians in World ofAthletics, 
CHI. SUN-TIMES,June 16, 1986, at 119 ("One of the first things Penn State coach Rene Portland 
brings up during a recruiting visit with a prospective player and her parents is lesbian activity. 'I 
will not have it in my program,' Portland said."). 
199. MacKinnon, supra note 148, at 120 ("Femininity has contradicted, masculinity has 
been consistent with, being athletic. Women get to choose between being a successful girl and a 
successful athlete."). MacKinnon suggests that the lesbian epithet helps construct the 
connection between women's athletic strength and sexual inaccessibility. Id. at 122. This 
explains why the epithet is used to suppress-or at least demand apologetic behavior as the 
price for-women's participation in sports. Id. 
200. See FESTLE, supra note 139, at 45. 
201. Id. at 49-50 (describing the player beauty pageant at the AAU women's basketball 
tournament); CAHN, supranote 146, at 135-36; McELWAIN, supra note 182, at 49-50, 91, 95-96 
(describing the "health contest" that was a component of the Iowa high school state 
tournament program until the 1940s, as well as the annual designated "cover girl" 
photographed for the tournament guide until 1992). 
202. CAHN, supranote 146, at 156 (describing the All-American Girls' Professional Baseball 
League's compulsory charm school); LENSKYJ, supranote 149, at 82. 
203. Alina Bernstein, Is It Timefor a Victory Lap? Changes in Media Coverage of Women in Sport, 
37 INT'L REV. SOC. SPORT 415, 420-21 (2002) (documenting various "different practices by 
which the media trivialize, and therefore undermine, women's athletic achievements, thus 
constructing female athleticism as not only 'other than' but as 'lesser than' the male's" 
including instances of sexual objectification, infantilization, and trivialization of women 
athletes); Susan Tyler Eastman &Andrew C. Billings, Sportscastingand Sports Reporting: The Power 
of Gender Bias, 24 J. SPORT & SOC. ISSUES 192, 208-210 (2000) (documenting gender bias in 
sports commentary, including that "the dating habits and families of women athletes were 
referred to more frequently than those of men"); Michael A. Messner et al., Silence, Sports Bras, 
and Wrestling Porn: Women in Televised Sports and Highlights Shows, 27 J. SPORT & SOC. ISSUES 38, 
47-49 (2003) (concluding that sportscasters devote most of their "sparse" coverage of women's 
sports to sexualizing female athletes and using them as the brunt ofjokes). 
This is no modern trend; throughout the history of women's sports, its coverage and 
promotion has attempted to normalize athletic participation by emphasizing the "female" in 
"female athlete." FESTLE, supra note 139, at 48-49 (describing efforts of the Amateur Athletic 
Union in the 1950s to normalize women's athletic participation by emphasizing their desire for 
motherhood and marriage); LENSKVJ, supranote 149, at 75 (describing efforts of "well-meaning 
journalists" in the 1930s to portray female athletes as "having lost none of their femininity" by 
describing them as "sweet and ladylike," groomed and attractive); MaryJo Kane, The Post Title IX 
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heterosexual idea are shunned and ostracized. °4 Both practices reinforce 
the social construct of a female athlete as a lesser or qualified version of a 
"normal" male athlete, which is also reflected in the resulting "apologetic 
behavior" of female athletes. Female athletes consciously or unconsciously 
endeavor to "minimiz[e] the perceived violation of social norms" as the price 
for playing sports.205 Apologetic behavior may be evident when, for example, 
girls take up cheerleading, which is culturally perceived as an acceptable 
feminine activity,2 6 either as "cover" for, or an alternative to, activity that is 
more readily perceived as athletic.2° 7 Or when players don makeup and wear 
their hair long.0 8 Or when women espouse preferences for male over female 
coaches 209 or for the gendered team nicknames--- la "Lady Volunteers"­
that reinforce the assumption that athletics, unqualified, is male. 210 
Apologetic behavior thus demonstrates not only the pressure women feel to 
participate in society's efforts to reduce the cognitive dissonance inherent in 
FemaleAthlete in the Media,J. PHYSICAL EDUC., RECREATION & DANCE, Mar. 1989, at 58 (depicting 
a 1989 media guide at Northwestern Louisiana State in which the women's basketball team 
posed with bunny ears and tails under the caption, "These Girls Can Play, Boy"). 
204. GRIFFIN, supranote 198, at 86 (describing how the lesbian epithet is used to "control, 
discredit, and intimidate women in sport"); Don Sabo & Sue CurryJensen, Prometheus Unbound: 
Constructionsof Masculinity in Sports Media, in MEDIASPORT 213-14 (Lawrence A. Wenner ed., 
1998) (pointing out examples of lesbian-baiting by the sports media and arguing that the 
practice "preserves the male hegemony in sport and society"). For an historic example of this 
trend, see LENSKYJ, supra note 149, at 85 (attributing efforts by female educators to screen out 
erstwhile physical education majors of "masculine-type" to a fear of "guilt by association"). 
205. FESTLE, supra note 139, at 45; id. at 46 ("Historians cannot know the full extent to 
which stigma constrained a woman athlete. After all, plenty of women played despite it. Still, the 
prevalence of public apologetic behavior among female athletes is a trend that both academics 
and athletes have long acknowledged."); see also CAHN, supranote 146, at 145. 
206. See, e.g., Laurel R. Davis, Male Cheerleaders and the Naturalization of Gender, in SPORT, 
MEN, AND THE GENDER ORDER, supranote 146, at 153, 154. 
207. LENSKYJ, supranote 149, at 103; Note, supra note 141, at 1632. 
208. Note, supra note 141, at 1632-33; id. at 1632 ("One need only count the number of 
female athletes who wear their hair long and in ponytails . . . to see that these instances are not 
isolated ones."). Relatedly, every single player in the 2005 Women's College World Series had 
long hair, and a majority of players wore makeup. One could suppose that such uniform and 
prevalent self-sexualization in today's college softball is deliberate compensation for softball's 
historic association with lesbians. 
In 2004, the U.S. Women's National Soccer Team named their official fan club the 
"Ponytail Posse." The players explain that the name is "meant to convey the combination of 
femininity and athleticism that is inherent in putting your hair up in a ponytail." See Ponytail 
Posse, http://ponytailposse.com/handler.cfm?cat-id=171827catid=17183 (last visited Feb. 24, 
2006). 
209. GRIFFIN, supra note 198, at 84; Kristine E. Newhall, Quality on Ice: Gender and 
Coaching in Women's Ice Hockey (May 4, 2004) (unpublished master's thesis, Simmons 
College) (on file with author) (finding evidence of this attitude among college women hockey 
players). 
210. Brake, supra note 141, at 110-11. Whether it is the Nittany Lions versus the Lady Lions 
or the Final Four versus the Women's Final Four, the lopsided use of gender qualifiers 
contributes to the construction of athletics that are, by default, masculine. See id. 
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the constructed paradox of the women athlete but also of the very existence 
of that cultural construction. 
4. Title IX and Its Backlash 
Title IX has increased opportunities for women's athletic participation 
over the last thirty years and has positively influenced women's interests and 
abilities in sports.21 At the same time, some aspects of the law itself, as well 
as society's reaction to it, have contributed to the antinormalization of 
women's sports. This subpart examines Title IX's antinormalization of 
women's sports in the following major areas: contact sports, expenditures, 
and scholarships. It analyzes how society's backlash against the opportunities 
that Title IX has provided to female students furthers this antinormalization. 
a. ContactSports 
The Tide IX implementing regulations require schools that do not offer 
a women's team in a particular sport to allow women to try out for a men's 
team in that sport.'1 This provision is qualified, however, by an exception 
for all contact sports. A school must let a woman 2 1 try out for the only tennis 
211. See generallyTrudy Saunders Bredthauer, Twenty-Five Years Under Title IX: Have We Made 
Progress?, 31 CREIGHTON L. REv. 1107 (1998); Note, supra note 141, at 1640-41; COMMISSION 
REPORT, supranote 6, at 10 ("I was here in 1972 when there was really no interest on the part of 
girls to participate, and the high school participation at that time was 8%. The schools were 
forced to offer opportunity, and my goodness, it's now up to 42 percent.") (quoting Christine 
Grant, Associate Professor and former Athletic Director, University of Iowa). 
212. This regulation, titled "Separate Teams," reads in full: 
Notwithstanding the requirements of paragraph (a) of this section [prohibiting 
gender discrimination in interscholastic, intercollegiate, club or intramural 
athletics], a recipient may operate or sponsor separate teams for members of each 
sex where selection for such teams is based upon competitive skill or the activity 
involved is a contact sport. However, where the recipient operates or sponsors a 
team in a particular sport for members of one sex but operates or sponsors no 
such team for members of the other sex, and athletic opportunities for members 
of that sex have previously been limited, members of the excluded sex must be 
allowed to try-out for the team offered unless the sport involved is a contact sport. 
For the purposes of this part, contact sports include boxing, wrestling, rugby, ice 
hockey, football, basketball and other sports the purpose or major activity of which 
involves bodily contact. 
34 C.F.R. § 106.41(b) (2005). 
213. The regulation refers not to women but to members of the sex whose athletic 
opportunities have been previously limited. Id. Courts have rejected a sport-specific 
construction of "previously limited athletic opportunities" advanced by men attempting to 
integrate women's field hockey teams. Williams v. Sch. Dist. of Bethlehem, 998 F.2d 168, 174-75 
(3d Cir. 1993); Kleczek v. R.I. Interscholastic League, Inc., 768 F. Supp. 951, 954-55 (D.R.I. 
1991). In both cases, the court held that, even if the plaintiffs satisfied the previously limited 
athletic opportunities requirement, field hockey's status as a contact sport thwarted efforts for 
relief. Williams, 998 F.2d at 173-74 (finding enough evidence to preclude plaintiffs' summary 
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or swimming team it offers, but when it comes to football, basketball, 
baseball, ice hockey, rugby, wrestling, or boxing-the contact sports 
enumerated in the regulations-schools can bar women from trying out for 
the only team. 214 Further, while a school may opt to add a women's 
basketball or hockey team to improve its proportionality numbers, it has no 
obligation to do so unless women can demonstrate that there is enough 
interest on campus to field an entire, reasonably competitive team.215 By 
allowing schools to exclude women from playing contact sports with men, 
the regulation reflects an assumption that women are too weak and frail to 
play with men 2l--an assumption that is sometimes accompanied by express 
rhetoric relegating contact sports to an exclusively male domain.217 
Moreover, the regulation's failure to require schools to provide 
equivalent teams for the women who are excluded from participating on 
men's teams contributes to association of those sports with masculinity. This 
message is further amplified by the regulation's distinctly different 
treatment of noncontact sports, under which schools are required to give 
women opportunities to participate. 2181 In these various ways, the regulation 
"locks in place the construction of particular sports as masculine and 
judgment); Kleczek, 768 F. Supp. at 955-56 (holding that field hockey's incidental bodily contact 
renders it a contact sport). 
214. See, e.g.,George, supra note 32, at 1114-15. Even though schools are not obligated 
under Title IX to let women try out for men's teams in contact sports, a state-sponsored 
educational institution's failure to do so may violate the Equal Protection Clause. See, e.g., Fortin 
v. Darlington Little League, 514 F.2d 344, 344 (1st Cir. 1975) (holding that a Little League, a 
state actor, could not categorically exclude girls); Hoover v. Meiklejohn, 430 F. Supp. 164, 164 
(D. Colo. 1977) (holding that a high school could not constitutionally exclude a girl from the 
only boy's soccer team on the basis of gender alone); Clinton v. Nagy, 411 F. Supp. 1396, 1400 
(N.D. Ohio 1974) (holding that the Equal Protection Clause required a municipal football 
league to let a qualified girl play). 
215. 1996 CLARIFICATION, supra note 15; see also Brake, supra note 141, at 139-40 (calling 
this a "modest concession" because "[flew female athletes will be able to affirmatively 
demonstrate enough interest and ability to support a viable team in a contact sport [in which 
they] have been denied access to any school-supported competition"). 
216. Brake, supra note 141, at 145 (citing Sangree, supra note 154, at 434-35); see also 
FIELDS, supranote 35, at 161 (suggesting that "[t]he [regulation's] exclusion of females from 
contact sports was symbolic of the exclusion of females from power"). 
217. For example, University of Iowa Head Football Coach Kirk Ferentz deflected criticism 
of a personal foul penalty called against his linebacker: "That's football. We're not wearing 
skirts ....Believe me, if he wanted to drill him he could have drilled him." Andrew Logue, 
Criticized Hawkeyes FireBack, DES MOINES REG., Nov. 9, 2005, at Cl. Along the same lines, the 
University of Iowa's decision to accommodate opposing football teams in an all-pink visitors' 
locker room-described by one reporter as "Barbie's Dream House on acid"-is a symbolic 
gesture of the same point that contact sports like football and femininity are mutually exclusive. 
See Sean Keeler, Hayden Lives On: Visitors' QuartersStill Pretty in Pink, DES MOINES REG., Aug. 21, 
2005 (describing the pink locker room). 
218. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(b) (2005). 
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feminine, and bolsters the construction of a dominant masculinity in 
219 
sport." 
b. Expenditureson Sports Teams 
The regulations allow schools to continue to heap large sums of money 
and favorable treatment on men's teams. This sends clear signals to 
women about how much less their participation is, literally, valued. The 
regulations expressly state that OCR will not judge compliance with the 
equal-opportunity requirement by whether a school makes equal aggregate 
° expenditures to its men's and women's programs.22 Thus, the 
implementing regulations to Title IX do nothing to close the persisting gap 
between the operating budgets for men's and women's sports. 221 
The regulations enumerate the factors OCR will consider in 
determining whether schools are providing equal treatment to their men's 
and women's athletics programs-factors such as travel and per diem 
expenses, compensation of coaches, and housing and dining services. 222 
However, the regulations do not require men's and women's programs to 
match up evenly in these areas. OCR explains that not requiring equal 
aggregate expenditures allows universities to take into account "unique 
aspects of particular sports or athletic activities" 223 when setting budgets for 
men's and women's programs. In other words, some sports are just 
inherently more expensive than others, and universities should have the 
flexibility to account for this. But as a result of this regulatory choice, 
universities have no legal incentive to eliminate disparities in coaching 
salaries, 224 equipment room access, number of training tables, and other 
indicia of quality of athletic opportunities that are available to female 
219. Brake, supra note 141, at 140. 
220. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c). 
221. Division I schools spend nearly twice as much-on average, almost $3 million more-
on men's sports than on women's sports. Women, on average, make up 54% of the enrolled 
student population. Welch Suggs, Some Men's Teams Are in Perilin Division I-A, CHRON. HIGHER 
EDuC.,June 18, 2004, at A34 tbl. 1; see also Welch Suggs, Small Colleges Spent 41% of Sports Budgets 
on Women's Teams, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC.,June 18, 2004, at A35 tbl.1 (reporting that colleges in 
NCAA Division III, where women comprise an average of 58% of the student population, 
collectively spend only 41% of their athletic budgets on women's sports, about $137,000 less 
than they spend on men's). 
222. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c) (2)-(10). 
223. 1979 Policy Interpretation, supra note 9, at 71,415 (acknowledging that "for the most 
part these factors will occur in programs offering football, and consequently these differences 
will favor men"). 
224. Suggs, Gender Quotas, supra note 71, at A24 (reporting that, at schools in NCAA 
Division I-A, men's teams have one and a half times as many coaches, and those coaches make 
more than twice what women's coaches make). 
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athletes today.22' Female athletes and outside observers may read these 
inequities, in the aggregate, as institutionalizing the inferior status of 
women's sports. 
c. Scholarships 
The regulations measure scholarship equity by whether the share of 
women's scholarships is proportionate to women's overall athleticS• 226 
participation. A school may provide relatively fewer scholarships for 
female athletes as long as it provides them relatively fewer opportunities 
overall. By one report, women receive $142 million less in scholarships than 
men. 22 7 This disparity puts an actual dollar value on how much less 
institutions "value" female athletes, and it does so permissibly under Title 
IX. These disparities "reinforce[] notions of male entitlement" in 
athletics. 22s As signals of women's athletics relative (lower) value, the 
disparity in scholarship money "contribute [s]
2 29 to the construction of interest 
in sport in a way that is not gender neutral."
d. Backlash Against Title IX 
To the extent that Title IX does compel or at least motivate schools to 
close the gap in participation between men and women, such progress is 
accompanied by backlash that (often intentionally) reinforces the gender 
hierarchy of sports.13 Pervasive rhetoric maintains that Title IX is "reverse 
discrimination 2 1' that benefits female athletes only at the expense of 
232 233men. This erroneous belief has fueled political and judicial challenges 
225. E.g., UNIV. OF IOWA, 2004-2005 DIVISION I ATHLETICS CERTIFICATION SELF-STUDY 
INSTRUMENT 52, 55-59 (2005), available at http://www.uiowa.edu/-our/ncaa-cert/steering/ 
051017fulldraft.pdf (reporting inequities along these lines). 
226. 34 C.F.R. § 106.37(c). 
227. Brake, supranote 141, at 76. 
228. Id. at 81. 
229. Id. at 82. 
230. See Susan L. Greendorfer, Title IX Gender Equity, Backlash andIdeology, WOMEN IN SPORT 
& PHYSICAL ACTIvIIYJ., Spring 1998, at 69, 73, 80-90. In the context of Title IX, Greendorfer 
explains that "[b] acklash emerges because resulting changes would be disruptive to the existing 
patriarch [y] that is manifest in sporting practice." Id. at 83. Moreover, backlash itself reinforces 
the dominant patriarchy of sports. Id. at 86 ("The very suggestion that the legal mandate is 
unfair to men reasserts a construction of sport as male and intimates that male interests should 
prevail."). 
231. Id. at 84. 
232. This rhetoric is as old as Title IX itself. Male coaches and administrators publicly 
objected to draft implementing regulations based on fears that they would "bankrupt" men's 
athletic programs. See FESTLE, supra note 139, at 127-29. It is worth noting that this criticism 
came at a time when only 30,000 women competed at an intercollegiate level, college athletic 
departments allocated 2% of budgets to women's sports, and women's athletic scholarships 
were unheard of. See generally WOMEN'S SPORTS FOUND.: TITLE IX AT 30: ATHLETICS RECEIVE C+, 
supra note 8. This Report Card underscores Greendorfer's conclusion that Title IX backlash, 
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to the proportionality prong of OCR's compliance test.234 Women 
themselves have been maligned by male administrators, coaches, and players 
in response to their efforts to secure equal treatment in athletics. 35 
5. The Effect of Opportunity on Interest and Participation 
The cumulative effect of the antinormalizing factors discussed in this 
section is to suppress women's interest and participation in sports. Scholars 
have analyzed the ways in which gender-coding of particular opportunities 
influences women's interest in pursuing them. For example, in her analysis 
of sex segregation in the workplace, Professor Vicki Schultz presents 
sociological research suggesting that women do not determine their interest 
in ajob independent of the job market itself.23 6 When women in a particular 
job do not receive the same rewards as men in the same position, or when 
they see that job opportunities in that field are rare, they tend to develop, or 
"premised on [a] doctrine of male superiority and privilege . . . ignores the fact that . .. the 
sporting status quo [is] the cultural consequence of discrimination and ideological 
socialization." Greendorfer, supranote 230, at 84. 
233. In the 1990s, men's teams were cut more frequently than women's teams, see 
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 6, at 19, but in recent years men's athletics overall has gained 
opportunities, not lost. See Suggs, Gender Quotas, supranote 71 (reporting that the Department 
of Education's most recent data shows men's college athletic opportunities increased "by about 
2,700 between 2002-3 and 2003-4, and the number of men's teams either increased or remained 
steady across all divisions"). 
To the extent that minor men's sports are getting squeezed, it is false to attribute this 
to women's sports and Title IX rather than the big budget, big roster sports like men's football 
and basketball that cause the disparities, and the budget crunches to begin with. Id.; see also 
John R. Thelin, Good Sports?HistoricalPerspectiveon the PoliticalEconomy of IntercollegiateAthletics in 
the Era of Title IX, 1972-1997,71 J. HIGHER EDUC. 391, 399-401 (2000) (describing in detail the 
increasing expenditures associated with football-including money spent to buy out coaches' 
salary contracts when they fail to win championships; aggressive recruitment and scholarship 
distribution; putting players, coaches and staff up at hotels on the eve of home games; providing 
year-round training tables and luxurious locker rooms; net expenses associated with going to a 
Bowl Game; and noting in this context that "expanded athletic department expenses cannot be 
explained wholly or even primarily by the increased expenses of women's athletic programs"). 
234. Nat'l Wrestling Coaches Ass'n v. Dep't of Educ., 366 F.3d 930, 936 (D.C. Cir. 2004), 
cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 2537 (2005) (dismissing for lack of standing wrestling coaches' claims that 
Title IX discriminates against male athletes); Chalenor v. Univ. of N.D., 291 F.3d 1042, 1043, 
1049 (8th Cir. 2002) (rejecting an argument by male athletes that the proportionality prong 
operated as a reverse-discrimination measure); COMMISSION REPORT, supranote 6, at 24-25. 
235. For example, after the University of Texas agreed to double the number of female 
athletes (increasing their percentage from 23% to 44% of all athletes) to settle Title IX 
litigation brought by seven female athletes, Texas players and coaches faced public criticism, 
harassment, and charges of lesbianism. FESTLE, supranote 139, at xxvi-xxviii. 
236. See generally Shultz, supra note 141. Professor Brake compares Shultz's factors 
influencing women's interest in jobs traditionally held by men to those that contribute to 
women's interests and abilities in sports. Brake, supra note 141, at 73-74. 
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at least report, other interests. 237 Efforts to preserve the hegemonic 
masculinity of a particular job are also successful at suppressing women's 
interests in those jobs. 238 Just as offering women opportunities inferior in 
quantity and quality suppresses interest, making opportunities available for 
women has the opposite effect. 
For example, Professor Schultz notes that women who work in blue-
collar trades and in jobs that are traditionally held by men often cite the 
employer's affirmative action as the reason they pursued that particular line 
of work. 39 In a similar vein, Professor Kimberly Yuracko explains that 
"because of the salience of gender-group membership, girls respond 
differently when they see a woman doing something than they do when they 
see a man doing the same thing."24° Consequently, "female athlete role 
models allow girls to develop an alternate vision in their own minds of who 
and what they can become, and of what socially valued versions of 
themselves might look like."241 More significantly, she argues, athletic 
opportunities for women, distributed in proportion to women's numbers on 
campus, help "change the social meaning attached to femaleness" and the 
cultural association of sport and masculinity. 
2 
In light of the different ways in which medical, social, educational and 
legal structures have constructed women's relationship to athletics, the 
effect of opportunity on women's interest in sports is clear. For example, 
women are likely to respond to the lack of opportunities to play 
intercollegiate football 43 by channeling their interests elsewhere, and they 
develop an interest in playing football in much lower numbers than men. 
When women perceive that they have lower chances of earning a scholarship 
than men, and when differentials in the operating budget and coaches' 
salaries imply the second-class treatment of their sports, women's interests 
develop in directions where equal treatment is more likely. Alternatives to 
sports may also be more appealing to women who are deterred by the still-
extant hegemonic masculinity of sports, or the related risk of being 
stigmatized as unfeminine, gay, or both, or the requisite self-sexualization to 
preempt that stigma. 
237. For example, in a study of secretaries, respondents "adjusted to their realistically 
nonexistent possibility of advancement by rating the desirability of promotion relatively low." 
Shultz, supra note 141, at 1829. 
238. Shultz describes how sexual harassment is an effort to either weed women out or make 
those who stay on the job "feel out of place," like "freaks" or "deviants," and "enables men to 
continue to define their work (and themselves) in masculine terms." Id. at 1837. 
239. Id. at 1829. 
240. Yuracko, supra note 15, at 792. Yuracko uses the role-modeling argument and other 
perfectionist rationales to defend Title IX's proportionality requirement. Id at 799-800. 
241. Id. at 793. 
242. Id. at 795-96. 
243. For a proposal to introduce women's intercollegiate football, see generally Rodney K. 
Smith, Solving the Title IX Conundrum with Women's Football 38 S. TEx. L. REv. 1057 (1997). 
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B. TrIIh IX AND STRUCTURALISM 
To the extent that Title IX has reduced the discrimination against 
women in college and university athletics, it has been because the three-
prong policy was written and interpreted in such a way that compliance 
measured under the second and third prongs was difficult to attain and 
sustain. This has nudged universities toward prong one, proportionality 
compliance. A university cannot sustain compliance with prong two's 
requirement of a history and continuingpractice of program expansion for 
very long without further increasing participation opportunities for women, 
ultimately arriving at the proportionality endpoint. Prong three, the focus of 
this Part, is written to prevent university athletic departments from justifying 
existing gender disparities on grounds that women are less interested in 
sports than men. In fact, every federal appellate court that has considered 
this "relative interest" approach has rejected it by insisting that if a university 
were to hinge its compliance on prong three, it had to "fully" accommodate 
women's interests and abilities, consistent with the express language of the• 244 
1979 Policy Interpretation. Further, courts that have considered the 
nature of evidence a university may use to show compliance, or on which a 
plaintiff may rely to prove noncompliance, have helped sustain prong 
three's high compliance bar.2
45 
As a mere exercise in giving meaning to every word in OCR's three-
prong policy, the courts' interpretation of prong three does not necessarily 
embody structuralism. Rather, it is in rationalizing why interest-defined 
compliance should not be so easy that the courts recognize, at least in 
general terms, the powerful social forces that construct women's interests in 
2 46 
athletics. 
This results in some doctrinal tension, however. Insisting that prong 
three compliance remains difficult to attain actually validates prong three's 
theoretical existence. Indeed, no court has suggested that prong three itself 
is inconsistent with Title IX or the U.S. Constitution-only rejected the 
watered-down versions of prong three put forth by university defendants or 
stymied male athlete plaintiffs. Yet the structuralist rationale the courts 
244. Neal v. Bd. of Trs. of Cal. State Univs., 198 F.3d 763, 767-69 (9th Cir. 1999); Cohen v. 
Brown Univ. (Cohen I1), 101 F.3d 155, 176 (1st Cir. 1996); Kelley v. Bd. of Trs., Univ. of Ill., 35 
F.3d 265, 270 (7th Cir. 1994); Cohen v. Brown Univ. (Cohen 1), 991 F.2d 888, 899 (1st Cir. 
1993); Roberts v. Colo. State Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824, 830 (10th Cir. 1993). 
245. Pederson v. La. State Univ. 213 F.3d 858, 878-79 (5th Cir. 2000); Cohen II, 101 F.3d at 
179-80. 
246. See, e.g., Nea4 198 F.3d at 769 ("Title IX has altered women's preferences, making 
them more interested in sports, and more likely to become student athletes .... Adopting [an] 
interest-based test for Title IX compliance would hinder, and quite possibly reverse, the steady 
increases in women's participation and interest in sports that have followed Title IX's 
enactment."); Cohen II, 101 F.3d at 179 (noting that "[i]nterest and ability rarely develop in a 
vacuum, [but] evolve as a function of opportunity and experience"). 
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employ in support of their rejection of a relaxed version of prong three 
undermines any form of interest-defined compliance, no matter how 
interest is measured or defined. 
The 1993 decision in Cohen v. Brown University247 is, both by its own 
description and any objective measure, the "watershed "2 48 decision about 
equal athletic opportunity under Title IX. It was the first case to reject a 
university's attempt to justify its disproportionate athletic offerings on the 
grounds that women were less interested in athletics than men. In 1991, 
Brown University announced the elimination of four intercollegiate athletic 
teams as a cost-cutting measure: women's volleyball, women's gymnastics, 
men's golf, and men's water polo.249 Gymnasts and volleyball players-
representing a class of all present and potential Brown University female 
student athletes-won an injunction ordering the reinstatement of their 
250 251teams. On appeal, the First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the 
district court's decision that, under the preliminary injunction standard, the 
plaintiffs were likely to prevail on their claim that Brown's decision violated 
Title IX. After a trial on the merits, the district court ruled that Brown's 





Even before the cut, Brown's percentage of female athletes was far from 
proportionate to its percentage of female students. 254 Brown also had a weak 
and spotty record of expanding women's athletics.25 5 The litigation therefore 
focused on whether Brown fully and effectively accommodated women's 
interests and abilities, in compliance with the third prong of OCR's policy. 
256 
Brown argued that it could satisfy the third prong by providing athletic 
opportunities to women "in accordance with the ratioof interested and able women 
to interested and able men,, 25 7 and that if the policy did not allow for 
compliance to be measured this way, then the policy violated both Title IX 
247. Cohen , 991 F.2d at 888. 
248. Id. at 891. 
249. Id.at 892. 
250. Cohen v. Brown Univ., 809 F. Supp. 978, 1001 (D.R.I. 1992). 
251. Cohen 1, 991 F.2d at 907. 
252. Cohen v. Brown Univ., 879 F. Supp. 184, 214 (D.R.I. 1995). 
253. Cohen v. Brown Univ. (Cohen I), 101 F.3d 155, 180 (lst Cir. 1996). 
254. During the preliminary injunction hearing, the statistical disparity was 10.9%, as 
women made up 36.7% of Brown's athletes and 47.6% of its enrolled undergraduates. However, 
even after Brown reinstated volleyball and gymnastics to satisfy the injunction, the statistical 
disparity increased to 13.01%, because while the percentage of female athletes rose to 38.13%, 
the percentage of women students rose to 51.14%. Id. at 163. 
255. Brown added a number of women's teams in the 1970s after it merged with all-
women's Pembroke College, but the only team added "after this period was winter track, in 
1982." Id. 
256. Cohen I, 991 F.2d at 903-04. 
257. Id. at 899. 
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and the U.S. Constitution.25 The First Circuit rejected Brown's arguments in 
both its first and second opinions on the case. 259 
The First Circuit rejected Brown's proposal to measure prong-three 
compliance in terms of relative interest as inconsistent with the policy's 
requirement that women's athletic interest and abilities be "fully and 
effectively accommodated" for an institution to comply under the third 
prong. The court held that this "myopic" view "reads the 'full' out of the 
duty to accommodate 'fully and effectively"' women's interests and abilities 
° in athletics. 2 In the face of Brown's disparate distribution of athletic 
opportunities between men and women and its lack of progress in 
expanding opportunities for women, the seemingly gender-neutral decision 
men's teams violated Title IX.
261 
to eliminate two women's teams and two 
The court acknowledged that relying on prong three to measure compliance 
with Title IX may require a university "to give the underrepresented gender 
(in this case, women) what amounts to a larger slice of a shrinking athletic­
,,262
opportunity pie. 
The First Circuit also insisted that its reading of the policy conformed to 
Title IX's "unmistakably clear mandate that educational institutions not use 
federal monies to perpetuate gender-discrimination. 2 6 ' Because "interest 
and ability rarely develop in a vacuum, [but they] evolve as a function of,,.264 
opportunity and experience, interest-defined compliance would "limit[] 
...program expansion for the underrepresented sex to the status quo level 
of relative interests" and would "entrench and fix by law the significant 
gender-based disparity in athletic opportunities [that] exist[s] at Brown."2 6' 
Further explaining its rejection of interested-defined compliance, the court 
noted: 
To assert that Tide IX permits institutions to provide fewer 
athletics participation opportunities for women than for men, 
based upon the premise that women are less interested in sports 
258. Id. at 899-900. 
259. Id.; see also Cohen v. Brown Univ, (Cohen I1), 101 F.3d 155, 175-76 (1st Cir. 1996). 
260. Cohen I, 991 F.2d at 899. 
261. Put more colorfully, "even balanced use of the budget-paring knife runs afoul of Title 
IX where, as here, the fruits of a university's athletic program remain ill-distributed after the 
trimming takes place." Id.at 906. 
262. Id.; see also Cohen I, 101 F.3d at 176 (quoting Cohen Ifor same). The First Circuit Court 
of Appeals also acknowledged deference to the policy as a "plausible, if not inevitable, reading 
of Title IX," affirming that the three-prong test as a whole is reasonably constructed to meet the 
statute's goal of determining whether a student has been excluded from participation in or 
denied the benefits of an athletic program. Cohen , 991 F.2d at 899; see also Cohen II, 101 F.3d at 
173 (citing Cohen Ifor same). 
263. Cohen1,991 F.2d at 907; see also Cohen II, 101 F.3d at 176 (citing Cohen lfor same). 
264. Cohen II, 101 F.3d at 179. 
265. Id. at 174 (quoting the district court opinion, Cohen v. Brown Univ., 879 F. Supp. 184, 
209 (D.R.I.1995)); id.at 176, 180. 
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than are men, is (among other things) to ignore the fact that Title 
IX was enacted in order to remedy discrimination that results from 
stereotyped notions of women's interests and abilities.266 
Brown also challenged the constitutionality of Title IX, arguing that if 
Title IX authorized a regulatory policy that required full accommodation of 
women's interests and abilities but not men's interests and abilities, then the 
statute would violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 
261 
The First Circuit held that, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, 
Congress and OCR reasonably based the legislation and regulations on a 
view that "women, given the opportunity, will naturally participate in 
athletics in numbers equal to men."26 Specifically, the court said, "[w]hile it 
might well be that more men than women at Brown are currently interested 
in sports, Brown points to no evidence in the record that men are any more 
likely to engage in athletics than women, absent socialization and disparate
269 
opportunities. 
The First Circuit's adamant rejection of the relative interest theory did 
not stop parties to Title IX litigation in other jurisdictions from advancing 
the same argument. Colorado State University ("CSU") defended its 
decision to cut women's softball27 0 by arguing that it cut men's baseball at 
the same time.271 CSU maintained that women's unmet interest and ability 
(measured by the number of disappointed softball players) was relative to 
men's (measured by the number of disappointed baseball players) and, 
therefore, permissible under the third prong.2 72 However, the Tenth Circuit 
Court of Appeals, citing Cohen I, determined that the third prong measures 
absolute interest, not relative unmet interest, when it came to women's 
athletics. 273 Therefore, the fact that CSU terminated an established, healthy 
women's team easily satisfied the court that the university was not 
accommodating women's interests and abilities in athletics.2
7 4 
266. Id. at 178-79. 
267. The Fifth Amendment's equal protection provision was at issue because Title IX was 
enacted pursuant to Congress's spending power, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, rather than its power to 
enforce the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection guarantee. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 
5. 
268. Cohen I, 991 F.2d at 900. 
269. Id. 
270. Like the Cohen plaintiffs, Jennifer Roberts and her co-plaintiffs easily established that 
CSU failed to satisfy prongs one and two because the proportion of athletic opportunities for 
women and enrolled female undergraduates differed by 10.5%, and CSU had a history and 
continuing practice of contracting, rather than expanding, opportunities for women. Roberts v. 
Colo.State Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824, 830 (10th Cir. 1993). 
271. Id. at 831. 
272. Id. 
273. Id. (citing Cohen I, 991 F.2d at 898). 
274. Id. at 832 n.1l (citing Cohen1,991 F.2d at 904). 
SURVEYSAYS...
 
The next year, relying on the First and Tenth Circuit decisions, the 
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals impliedly rejected a relative interest 
approach to prong-three compliance when it held that the University of 
Illinois's decision to eliminate its men's swimming team-but not its 
women's swimming team-was a "reasonable response to the requirements 
of the applicable regulation and policy interpretation.,2 7 5 The Seventh 
Circuit thus recognized prong three as an absolute, not relative, prohibition 
against unmet interest among women athletes when it noted that, had 
Illinois terminated women's swimming, it would have failed prong three, as 
"women with a demonstrated interest in an intercollegiate athletic activity 
and demonstrated ability to compete at [that] level would be left without an 
opportunity to participate in their sport."
276 
When the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals considered the relative 
interest theory, it did so at the plaintiffs' behest. Wrestlers at Cal State-
Bakersfield claimed that the University's decision to cap its men's wrestling 
team, pursuant to a consent decree, violated Title IX.277 The wrestlers 
argued that "gender-conscious remedies are appropriate only when 
necessary to ensure that schools provide opportunities to males and females 
. ,,278in proportion to their relative levels of interest in sports participation. 
Nonetheless, the Ninth Circuit insisted that the plaintiffs' proposed 
qualification of interest would be inconsistent with Title IX, since "requiring 
only that each gender's expressed interest in participating be 
accommodated equally would freeze the inequality of the status quo."279 The 
court continued: 
Title IX [envisions] equal opportunity for all athletes and 
recognizes that, where society has conditioned women to expect 
less than their fair share of the athletic opportunities, women's 
interest in participating in sports will not rise to a par with men's 
overnight .... Title IX has altered women's preferences, making 
them more interested in sports, and more likely to become student 
athletes . . . . Adopting [an] interest-based test for Title IX 
compliance would hinder, and quite possibly reverse, the steady 
275. Kelley v. Bd.of Trs., Univ. of Ill.,35 F.3d 265, 270 (7th Cir. 1994). The University of 
Illinois failed proportionality compliance by more than twenty percentage points and did not 
have a history and continuing practice of expanding athletic opportunities for women. See id. at 
269.
 
276. Id. at 270. 
277. Neal v. Bd. of Trs.of Cal. State Univs., 198 F.3d 763, 765-66 (9th Cir. 1999). 
278. Id. at 767. 
279. Id. at 769-70 (citing Cohen v. Brown Univ. (Cohen II), 101 F.3d 155, 178-79 (1st Cir. 
1999)). 
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increases in women's . . . sports that have followed Title IX's 
28 0 
enactment. 
In addition to rejecting a relative approach to measuring 
accommodation of women's interests and abilities under prong three, courts 
have also considered what types of evidence can properly establish 
compliance or noncompliance with that test. 28 1 Again, their reasoning on 
this part reflected the view that when it comes to using interest levels to 
define compliance, Title IX requires that a high bar must be set. 
In its second decision in Cohen v. Brown University,'82 the First Circuit 
rejected the argument that statistical evidence alone could suffice as a 
measure of compliance with prong three. The court wrote that "there exists 
the danger that, rather than providing a true measure of women's interest in 
sports, statistical evidence purporting to reflect women's interest instead 
provides only a measure of the very discrimination that is and has been the 
2 8 3 
basis for women's lack of opportunity to participate in sports."
Acknowledging that Title IX and its regulations permit statistics derived 
from an interest survey to measure interests and abilities for the purposes of 
determining whether an institution complies with prong three, it rejected 
the argument that this statistical evidence "standing alone" can justify 
11 ,284"providing fewer opportunities for women than for men. Significantly, 
the First Circuit rejected the very method for measuring interest-statistical 
evidence "standing alone"-that OCR would later sanction in 2005. 
285 
280. Id. 
281. Cohen II, 101 F.3d at 179-80; Pederson v. La. State Univ., 213 F.3d 858, 878-79 (5th 
Cir. 2000). 
282. Cohen II, 101 F.3d at 155. 
283. Id. at 179. 
284. Id. at 179-80. This section is arguably dictum; the court was clear that even if such 
evidence was reliable, it was "irrelevant where, as here, viable and successful women's varsity 
teams have been demoted or eliminated." Id,at 180. 
285. While the First Circuit's express rejection of Brown's attempt to rely on statistical 
evidence alone, see id. at 179-80, does not bode well for the 2005 Clarification, it does not 
necessarily mean that the 2005 Clarification is doomed to a similar fate. Unlike a university, 
OCR is entitled to deference for any regulatory construction that is not "arbitrary, capricious, or 
manifestly contrary to the statute." Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 
837, 844 (1984). 
However, courts will extend somewhat less deference to an agency's policy 
interpretation of its own regulations. See Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 588 (2000) 
(suggesting that opinion letters and other policies are entitled to respect but not deference). 
Even after Christensen,federal appellate courts have continued to apply Chevrondeference to the 
three-prong policy, because OCR promulgated the policy using formal rulemaking procedures. 
See Miami Univ. Wrestling Club v. Miami Univ., 302 F.3d 608, 615 (6th Cir. 2002); see also 
Chalenor v. Univ. of N.D., 291 F.3d 1042, 1046-47 (8th Cir. 2002) (deferring to OCR's three-
prong policy because it interpreted an ambiguous regulation). But because the 2005 
Clarification is a policy interpretation rather than a formally promulgated regulation, courts are 
likely to apply Christensenrespect rather than Chevrondeference to determine whether the 2005 
Clarification is a permissible construction of Title IX. 
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While the First Circuit adopted a restrictive view of the type of evidence 
a university might put forth to prove compliance with prong three, the Fifth 
Circuit adopted a permissive view of what a plaintiff must demonstrate to 
show that a university is not complying.28 6 Female Louisiana State University 
("LSU") students and erstwhile athletes sued LSU challenging, among other 
things, its failure to field a women's fast-pitch softball team (at any level) as a 
violation of Title IX.
28 7 
The district court found the requisite level of women's interest and 
ability based on a variety of evidence. First, LSU had a women's fast-pitch 
softball team from 1979 until 1983, when it was disbanded by the 
university. 2ss Second, since that time, national, regional, and local interest in 
women's fast-pitch softball had increased at both the high school and 
intercollegiate level.2 9 Third, the plaintiffs testified that they were interested 
in and capable of competing on an intercollegiate softball team at any level 
gof competition . 290 When LSU complained to the Fifth Circuit that this 
evidence did not sustain the plaintiffs' burden of proving noncompliance 
with prong three ,9 the court called LSU "brazen[], 92 The court saw LSU's 
defense as an argument that an "institution with no coach, no facilities, no 
varsity team, no scholarships, and no recruiting in a given sport must have 
on campus enough national-caliber athletes to field a competitive varsity 
team in that sport before a court can find sufficient interest and abilities to 
exist."293 The court refused to adopt such criteria, which would "eliminate an 
effective accommodation claim by any plaintiff at any time. 
"294 
The above discussion shows how courts have consistently rejected efforts 
to water down prong-three compliance and have required schools that have 
not attained proportionality compliance to fully accommodate women's 
interests in athletics--even if it means granting immunity from lawsuits 
challenging budget-driven decisions to terminate men's teams. There are, 
effectively, two strains of reasoning that the courts espouse in support of this 
conclusion. First, the courts recognize that anything less than full 
accommodation of women's interests (absent proportionally distributed 
286. Pederson v. La. State Univ., 213 F.3d 858, 878-79 (5th Cir. 2000). 
287. Id. at 864. 
288. Pederson v. La. State Univ., 912 F. Supp. 892, 915 (M.D. La. 1996), rev'd,201 F.3d 388 
(5th Cir. 2000), supersededand vacated by panelon reh'g,213 F.3d 858 (5th Cir. 2000). 
289. Id. 
290. Id. 
291. With a twenty-point disparity between the percentage of athletic opportunities for 
women (29%) and the percentage of women enrolled as undergraduates (49%), LSU flunked 
the substantial proportionality prong by as many percentage points as Brown and CSU 
combined. Pederson, 213 F.3d at 878. Nor did LSU have a history and continuous practice of 
expanding women's athletics programs. Id. at 879. 
292. Id. at 878. 
293. Id. 
294. ld. 
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athletic opportunities) relies on-and validates-the stereotype that women 
are less interested in athletics than men, an assumption that is inconsistent 
with Title IX.295 Had the courts stopped here, their reasoning would reflect 
basic formal equality by insisting on similar treatment for similarly situated 
(interested) women and men-free of the stereotypes about women's 
interest.296 As Professor Vicki Shultz explains, such a theory is problematic 
because it is only concerned with individual women who happen to develop 
an interest in nontraditional work or sports notwithstanding the social 
structures operating to suppress that interest.297 This absolves the regulated 
institution (an employer, an educational institution) from having to provide 
opportunity in order to generate interest among women. 298 
However, the courts did more than just insist that it was impermissible 
to rely on stereotyped notions about women's interests in sports. Instead, 
they recognized that any attempt to measure that interest would reflect the 
effects of "socialization and disparate opportunities."2 99 Additionally, the•-300 
courts recognized that just as lack of opportunities suppresses interest,• 	 • 01 
providing opportunities to women generates their interest in sports. 
295. 	 The Cohen II courtstated:
 
To assert that Title IX permits institutions to provide fewer athletic participation
 
opportunities for women than men, based upon the premise that women are less
 
interested in sports than are men, is (among other things) to ignore the fact that
 
Title IX was enacted in order to remedy discrimination that results from 
stereotyped notions of women's interests and abilities. 
Cohen v. Brown Univ., 101 F.3d 155, 178-79 (1st Cir. 1996); see also Neal v. Bd. of Trs. of Cal. 
State Univs., 198 F.3d 763, 768 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Cohen II for same). 
296. This reasoning does not necessarily proscribe institutions from using something other 
than stereotypes to justify a conclusion that women are less interested in athletics than men. 
Courts allowed favorable treatment to women's teams relative to men's-i.e., giving them a 
"larger piece" of the shrinking pie. See Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 906 (1st Cir. 1993); 
Kelley v. Bd. of Trs., Univ. of Ill., 35 F.3d 265, 272 (7th Cir. 1994) ("Allowing a school to 
consider gender when determining which athletic programs to terminate ensures that in 
instances where overall athletic opportunities decrease, the actual opportunities to the 
underrepresented gender do not."). Such an outcome could be justified solely by the 
defendant's failure to make a case that something other than stereotypes were at play, and 
distinguished from future cases in which something other than stereotypes might be proffered 
in support of relative interest. 
297. Shultz, supra note 141, at 1807-08. 
298. Id. 
299. Cohen I, 991 F.2d at 900; see also Cohen II, 101 F.3d at 179 (suggesting that statistical 
evidence of women's interest in sports is likely to reflect women's lack of opportunity). 
300. See Pederson v. La. State Univ., 213 F.3d 858, 878 (5th Cir. 2000) (recognizing that 
evidence of interest in softball among LSU women was likely to be sparse, as there was "no 
coach, no facilities, no varsity team, no scholarships, and no recruiting"); Cohen II, 101 F.3d at 
179 (noting that "interest and ability rarely develop in a vacuum; they evolve as a function of 
opportunity and experience"). 
301. Neal v. Bd. of Trs. of Cal. State Univs., 198 F.3d 763, 769 (9th Cir. 1999) ("Tide IX has 
altered women's preferences, making them more interested in sports."). 
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view30 2 This second, structuralist-influenced bolsters the courts' 
conclusion that relative interest theories and evidence standards that favor 
universities should not water down prong-three compliance. The Ninth 
Circuit even expressly suggested that an "interest-based test for Tide IX 
compliance would hinder, and quite possibly reverse, the steady increases in 
women's participation in sports that have followed Tide IX's enactment."
30 3 
Inconsistently, however, the courts have left prong three intact, inviting 
future courts, OCR, and the regulated community to infer that interest, 
properly measured and defined, can justify something less than 
proportionality compliance. 
C. 2005 CLARIFICA TONABANDONS THESTRUCTURALISTEQUALITY OF TITLE IX 
If female students are satisfied with the fact that their university offers relatively 
fewer athletic opportunities to women than to men, how can the university be 
discriminatingagainstwomen? 
The 2005 Clarification reduces Title IX's application to college athletics 
to this answer-begging question, which itself reveals the policy's conceptual 
flaw. Even under the best possible survey conditions-widespread, careful 
participation by all relevant respondents34-the very concept of using survey 
responses to set participation rates for women is inconsistent with Tide IX's 
anti-discrimination mandate. 
Discrimination persists, as the courts have held, when universities 
accept and perpetuate stereotypes about women's interests in athletics. By 
introducing the Model Survey, the 2005 Clarification gives universities an 
alternative to relying on stereotypes. In this way, the 2005 Clarification 
attempts3°5 to espouse a basic formal equality-treating sports-drawn women 
similarly to sports-drawn men. However, the 2005 Clarification is 
incompatible with the courts' additional, structuralist reasoning. The courts 
understood that gender stereotypes contributed to a deficit in both the 
number and nature of existing athletic opportunities for women, and that 
no measure of interest, particularly a survey, can control for the effect of this 
deficit on women's reported interest. 
0 6 
302. The Ninth Circuit cited Note, supranote 141, at 1640-41, and Bredthauer, supra note 
211, at 1107, to support the causal connection between opportunity and interest. Neal, 198 F.3d 
at 769. 
303. Neal, 198 F.3d at 769. 
304. For arguments why this is unlikely, see supraPart II. 
305. I explain in infra Part III.D why even if the survey method proposed in the 2005 
Clarification could identify similarly situated individuals, it still fails to provide similar 
treatment. 
306. Cohen v. Brown Univ., 101 F.3d 155, 180 (1st Cir. 1996) ("[Empirical] evidence, 
standing alone, cannot justify providing fewer athletics opportunities for women than for 
men."). 
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Women's responses to the questions "are you interested" and "are you 
capable"-the key questions in the Model Survey-will inevitably reflect the 
medical, social, educational, and legal structures that have socially 
constructed women's perceived limited interest in sports. 3 7 Using these 
results to determine a university's compliance obligation perpetuates these 
interest-suppressing structures and therefore contravenes the anti­
discrimination mandate of Title IX. 
The 2005 Clarification also upends the three-prong policy by allowing 
schools to rely comfortably on prong three as an end-point for compliance. 
In the past, schools that satisfied prong three notwithstanding lopsided 
athletic offerings still had motivation to strive for proportionality under 
prong one. Prong three's former approach incorporated a variety of factors, 
including regional trends, as well as qualitative and quantitative measures of 
student interest.308 The increase in a particular sport's popularity within the 
community or a rise in the number of students or applicants who expressed 
an interest in that sport (factors difficult for a university to control and 
predict) could expose the school to an enforcement action by OCRjudicial 
action. In contrast, prong-one proportionality compliance-though more 
difficult to achieve for schools with low percentages of female athletes, high 
percentages of female students, or both-offers a truly safe haven. Once a 
school brings women's relative representation in the athletics program close 
to its relative female representation on campus, it can reasonably expect to 
successfully defend its program's offerings against regulatory or judicial 
scrutiny. Moreover, unlike the pre-2005 factors contributing to a prong-
three determination, the factors contributing to proportionality compliance 
are within the university's control (as with the number of participation 
opportunities offered to women and men) and easier to predict (as with the 
gender breakdown of the student body" 9). 
The 2005 Clarification makes prong three into an equally attainable 
safe haven. So long as the results of the survey do not reveal an entire team's 
worth of women interested and capable of competing in a particular sport, 
the university is assured that those statistics will insulate it from Title IX 
liability. The factors courts consider in prong-three compliance, once 
indeterminate and beyond the university's control, are now just as 
predictable and manageable as the factors contributing to proportionality. 
Relying on the questionable causal connection between opportunity and 
307. See supraPart II.A. 
308. OCR's complete list of factors contributing to a determination of unmet interest is set 
forth in supranote 57 and accompanying text. 
309. For example, the National Center for Education Statistics predicts that women's 
enrollment will increase 22% between 2000 and 2013 and that men's enrollment will increase 
15% in that same time period. NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, PROJECTIONS OF EDUCATION 
STATISTICS TO 2013 (Oct. 2003), availableat http://nces.ed.gov/programs/projections. 
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° interest,1 a university can anticipate that the Model Survey results will show 
relatively low interest among women in sports that the university does not 
offer. Further, by failing to increase offerings in women's sports, a university 
can deter women interested in that sport from applying for admission and 
enrolling. 
This second criticism reflects deficiencies in prong three and the 2005 
Clarification. By various courts' own reasoning proffered against watered-
down versions of prong three," they should have condemned prong three 
entirely rather than simply nullifying its effects by making it harder and less 
desirable to attain. It is no wonder colleges and universities complain that 
they are confused by what Title IX requires.112 On one hand, OCR continues 
to insist that the three-prong test is flexible,"3 that each prong is an "equally 
sufficient means of complying with Title IX, " "' and that "no one prong is 
favored."31 5 On the other hand, OCR, bolstered by the courts, has made 
compliance under prongs two and three difficult to attain and to sustain. 
D. 	 2005 CLARwFICATIONDOES NOT REQUIRE SIMILAR TREATMENT 
FORMEN'S AND WOMEN'S SPORTS 
Not only is the newly clarified prong three incapable of accurately 
defining a class of "sports-interested women" for the purpose of comparing 
their treatment to that of sports-interested men, it fails to provide that class 
of women equal treatment to similarly situated male counterparts. 
Pursuant to the 2005 Clarification, universities may now set 
participation levels for women-or more accurately, justify existing 
disparities in participation-based on the responses of its enrolled female 
students. That universities recruit many, or in some cases most, of their 
athletes-male and female alike-shows the senselessness of making 
program expansion for women contingent on survey responses from a self-
selected pool of nonrecruits. 31 6 By expecting sports-interested women to 
express interest and ability in nonexistent opportunities, the 2005 
Clarification treats them differently than sports-interested men. 
At schools where the 2005 Clarification and prong-three compliance is 
relevant, male students participate in sports at a higher rate than women, 
because those schools cannot satisfy prong-one proportionality. In setting 
men's participation levels, a university does not require men to show up to 
nonexisting opportunities before they are deemed "interested." It decides 
310. See supraPart H.B. 
311. Supra Part III.B. 
312. COMMISSION REPORT, supranote 6, at 25-26. 
313. 1996 CLARIFICATION, supranote 15; 2003 CLARIFICATION, supranote 20. 
314. 2003 CLARIFICATION, supra note 20. 
315. Id. 
316. See supraPart II.B.2 (arguing that the target population is illogical). 
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whether to continue to field a men's team based on the men who have 
shown up to play, including many who were recruited by the university's own 
affirmative efforts.3 17 In contrast, pursuant to the 2005 Clarification, the 
university can make its decision about whether there is sufficient interest to 
field a women's team without considering the effect that more opportunities 
and affirmative recruiting would have on getting interested women to enroll. 
The policy does not ensure neutral treatment of male and female athletes, 
because men get the benefit of a presumption of higher interest. Women 
have to prove theirs.318 
IV. A PROPOSAL FOR REFORM 
As the last Part explained, interest-defined compliance has always 
conceptually defied Title IX. For the last twelve years, however, courts have 
minimized this problem by enforcing a construction of prong three that 
made it a difficult and uncertain measure of compliance.3 1 9 This, in turn, 
made prong one a more attractive alternative. The criticism aimed at the 
2005 Clarification, which changed prong three by making it easier to achieve 
and more reliable as a bulwark to litigation, exposes the latent tension 
lurking in the three-prong policy itself: on one hand, a structuralist-inspired 
progress-seeking push toward prong one proportionality compliance, and 
on the other, the potential for structuralism-defying, status-quo-sustaining, 
interest-defined compliance. As a result of this tension, any proposal for 
reform must go beyond repealing the 2005 Clarification and address the 
problems inherent in the three-prong policy that cause universities and 
other Title IX skeptics to agitate for reform. 
This Part first explores the sources of confusion underlying OCR's 
three-prong policy. Then, it suggests two alternative means for reform in 
addition to merely repealing the 2005 Clarification that would alleviate the 
latent tension without violating structuralist-equality principles. One way is 
317. As a percentage of the overall student athlete population, female athletes are actually 
more likely to have been recruited than male athletes, because football teams offer many 
opportunities for walk-ons. DONNA LOPIANO, WOMEN'S SPORTS FOUND., EQUITY IN WOMEN'S 
SPORTS-A HEALTH AND FAIRNESS PERSPECTIVE, http://womenssportsfoundation.org/cgi­
bin/iowa/issues/rights/article.html?record=121 (last visited Feb. 24, 2006). However, even the 
average Division I football team, with thirty-two walk-on players, has eighty-five recruited 
scholarship players. ANDREW ZIMBALIST, WOMEN'S SPORTS FOUND., FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY, 
NOT WEAKENING CIVIL RIGHTS LAW, Is KEY TO TITLE IX COMPLIANCE AND DETERRING 
INSTITUTIONS FROM DISCONTINUING SOME MEN'S SPORTS TEAMS (Dec. 2002), 
http://womenssportsfoundation.org. Assuming those eighty-five men account for some of the 
proportionality differential, these recruited players are getting preferential treatment (the 
presumption of their interest) as compared to the women who could have been recruited for a 
complementary women's program in football or some other sport. 
318. See Jocelyn Samuels & Kristen Galles, In Defense of Title IX: Why Current Policies Are 
Requiredto EnsureEquality of Opportunity, 14 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 11, 39 (2003). 
319. See supraPart III.B. 
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to re-clarify the three-prong policy in a way that endorses proportionality 
under prong one as the only favored means of long-term compliance with 
Title IX. Or OCR could adopt an alternative fourth prong that would be a 
suitable endpoint for compliance, such as proportionality of aggregate 
expenditures on women's and men's athletics programs. 
A. SOURCES OF CONFUSION:MIXED MESSAGES AND INTELLECTUAL INCONSISTENCY 
OCR has repeatedly emphasized the flexibility inherent in three 
equally favored prongs with which colleges and universities can choose to 
demonstrate Title IX compliance. At the same time, before the 2005 
Clarification, OCR and the courts rejected universities' efforts to water 
prong-three compliance down to a test of relative interest demonstrable by 
survey evidence alone. As discussed above, the courts have essentially 
decided that for interest-defined compliance to be permissible, it must 
effectively be unattainable, at least as a compliance endpoint. 
OCR's 2005 Clarification reconciles this tension but, as argued above, in 
a manner that is inconsistent with Title IX. If the First Circuit's distrust of 
"statistical evidence, without more0 20 is any indication, courts may be willing 
to forgo the deference they have repeatedly extended to OCR's 
implementing regulations under Title IX.12 1 Alternatively, OCR could cave 
under political pressure over time and repeal the 2005 Clarification itself. 
Even if OCR rescinds the 2005 Clarification, without additional 
modification of the three-prong compliance policy, the agency will continue 
to send mixed messages about the nature of the three-prong test. College 
and university athletic departments will go right back to wondering why 
prong three, if it is as equally favored as OCR keeps insisting, remains a 
more difficult and less reliable measure of compliance than prong one? 
They will continue to report "confusion" over the three-prong policy,3 22 and 
OCR will continue to issue "clarifications" that do not contain any real 
clarity.323 This will continue to distract both sides from the necessary task of 
devising equitable, fiscally responsible, and politically acceptable solutions 
for Title IX compliance. 
B. RE-CLARFICATION 
The solution could be as simple as an express admission from OCR that 
prong three is not equally favored. Instead, OCR could declare prong three, 
320. Cohen v. Brown Univ., 101 F.3d 155, 179 (1st Cir. 1996). 
321. See supra note 285 (explaining that federal appellate courts have applied traditional 
Cheuron deference to OCR's three-prong policy, but will likely examine the 2005 Clarification 
with greater scrutiny because it did not result from a formal rulemaking process). 
322. COMMISSION REPORT, supranote 6, at 25-26. 
323. 2003 CLARIFICATION, supra note 20 (reiterating the flexibility of the three-prong test 
and reminding regulated universities that no one prong is favored). 
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like prong two, to be an interim compliance measure that affords 
universities immunity until they ultimately reach proportionality 
compliance. Such a clarification would be consistent with the courts' view 
that prong three cannot be satisfied when interested and able female 
athletes are denied the opportunity to play.324 It would also explain why 
universities must rely on a variety of qualitative and fluid factors to measure 
interest. OCR should make clear that prong three is unappealing on purpose 
it does not want universities to rely on it forever. This approach would 
basically collapse the three-prong policy into a proportionality test with two 
alternatives for interim compliance. 
A new policy mandating (or clarifying) that prong-one proportionality 
is the mandatory compliance endpoint could be challenged as beyond the 
scope of Title IX or Congress's authority to remedy past discrimination. The 
courts that have upheld the three-prong policy have avoided arguments that 
mandatory proportionality contravenes the statute or the Constitution by 
pointing out that proportionality is one of three choices for compliance. 
However, while the legality of a mandatory proportionality policy is 
uncertain, it is defensible. Congress may exercise otherwise-constitutional 
authority to provide a remedy for past discrimination without running afoul 
of the equal protection principles in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment,3 6 as long as Congress has authorized a remedial measure that 
is substantially related to an- important government interest.32v The courts 
that have considered the constitutionality of Title IX as construed by the 
three-prong test have recognized that ending the legacy of gender 
discrimination in extracurricular activities, such as athletics, is an important 
324. See supraPart III. 
325. Cohen II, 101 F.3d at 171 (concluding that the proportionality prong is constitutional 
in part because "it is but one aspect of the inquiry into whether an institution's athletics 
program complies with Title IX"); Kelley v. Bd. of Trs., Univ. of Ill., 35 F.3d 265, 271 n.6 (7th 
Cir. 1994) ("We express no opinion as to whether, if the policy interpretation did in fact 
mandate substantial proportionality, it would be unconstitutional or in contravention of the 
statute."). 
326. Kelley, 35 F.3d at 272; Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 901 (1st Cir. 1993). 
Congress enacted Title IX under its authority deriving from the Spending Clause, U.S. CONST. 
art. I, § 8, cl.1. See generallyJackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 554 U.S. 167 (2005). As a 
federal statute, Title IX must comply with the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause, which 
protects citizens from equal protection violations by the federal government to the same extent 
that the Fourteenth Amendment protects citizens from equal protection violations by states. See 
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 217-18 (1995). 
327. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 558 (1996); Ke//y, 35 F.3d at 272 (applying 
intermediate scrutiny to Title IX); see also Cohen II, 101 F.3d at 183-84. Cohen II did not 
reconsider the CohenI court's decision upholding the constitutionality of Title IX as construed 
by the three-prong policy. It considered whether the district court's remedial order was itself a 
violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and acknowledged that 
the equal protection guarantee of the Fifth Amendment was coextensive with the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth. Cohen I, 101 F.3d at 182 n.20. 
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government objective.32 8 They have also found Title IX and the three-prong 
compliance policy substantially related to that objective.329 
Mandatory proportionality is equally related to the important 
government objective of ending the legacy of gender discrimination in 
college athletics. In fact, it is a more appropriate means of satisfying that 
objective than the three-prong test. The three-prong test allows universities 
to offer disproportionate opportunity so long as they fully accommodate 
what they believe to be women's interests and abilities. However, as this 
Article has explored, interest in athletics is disproportionately lower among 
female students because of the socially constructed antinormalization of 
women's participation. This, in turn, is rooted in "'fixed notions concerning 
the roles and abilities of males and females' 3 3 0  or "overbroad 
generalizations about the different talents, capacities, or preferences of 
males and females." 3 1 Until women and girls have been allowed to 
participate in athletics on equal terms as men and boys, Congress can 
reasonably infer that women's disproportionately low interest in athletics 
results, ultimately, from "fixed notions" and "overbroad generalizations" 
about gender. Therefore, it can constitutionally assent to a regulatory policy 
that seeks to equalize the distribution of those opportunities.3 32 
C. PROPORTIONATEEXPENDITURES: A FOURTHPRONG OF COMPLIANCE? 
Instead of affirming proportionality as the single favored prong, OCR 
could offer university athletic departments true flexibility by offering them 
another manner of compliance that would be suitable as an endpoint for 
328. Kelley, 35 F.3d at 272; see also Neal v. Bd. of Trs. of Cal. State Univs., 198 F.3d 763, 
767-69 (9th Cir. 1999); Cohen II, 101 F.3d at 184 (finding an important government objective of 
"'avoid[ing] the use of federal resources to support discriminatory practices'") (internal 
citation omitted). 
329. Neal, 198 F.3d at 772; Cohen II, 101 F.3d at 184; Kelley, 35 F.3d at 272 (protecting the 
interest of the disproportionately burdened gender satisfies equal protection). These courts 
were focused not so much on the question of the constitutional proportionality requirement, 
but the interpretation of the third prong of compliance that protected women's teams at 
institutions where proportionality was not met. 
330. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 541 (quoting Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 725 
(1982)). 
331. Id. at 533, 541; see also supraPart III.A. 
332. Even if proportionality was overbroad as a remedy, owing to doubts that men's and 
women's relative interest in athletics was anything but the same, it would still be an appropriate 
means to enforce the antidiscrimination mandate. Unlike other contexts subject to remedial 
antidiscrimination measures, such as employment and educational opportunities generally, 
Congress has endorsed separate men's and women's sports. In order to set up a scheme in 
which, contrary to our instincts, separate actually means equal, it is appropriate to construe 
Title IX as insisting on equitable allocation of resources. Cf Kelley, 35 F.3d at 271 (noting, in 
dicta, that "once it is agreed Title IX does not require that all teams be co-ed ... schools must 
be provided some means of establishing that despite offering single-sex teams, they have 
provided 'equal athletic opportunit[ies] ... for both sexes'"). 
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compliance. Under this approach, prong two and prong three (the pre-2005 
version) would both be available for universities to use as interim 
compliance measures, or stopover points on the way to prong one or four. 
To be consistent with Title IX, the regulatory policy as interpreted by 
the courts, and the structuralist-equality principles attendant to Title IX, this 
hypothetical "fourth prong" would measure whether universities have 
"accommodated the interests and abilities of both sexes"-the prong-three 
regulatory standard that Congress has endorsed-by taking into account the 
role that universities themselves have played, and continue to play, in 
constructing women's interests in athletics. It would insist that universities 
ultimately comply with Title IX in a manner that does not suppress women's 
interest in athletics by sanctioning a distribution of resources that appears to 
favor men. 
Under this hypothetical prong four, courts would not judge an 
institution's athletic offerings to be discriminatory under Title IX when, if 
they are not proportional in number, they are at least proportional in 
nature. If a university can demonstrate that its aggregate expenditures to 
men's and women's athletic programs are substantially proportionate to 
their respective enrollments, it would also comply with Title IX's mandate of 
nondiscrimination in athletic participation. Equal distribution of financial 
resources is an appropriate measure of nondiscrimination under Title IX 
because it puts the burden on the university to signal equal respect for 
women's and men's sports (crucial as one considers that lack of athletic 
opportunities at a college level have suppressed women's interest in sports) 
rather than put the burden on women to self-generate interest in order to 
warrant the opportunity to play. 
Currently, Title IX's regulations allow OCR to consider whether 
universities equitably support their men's and women's programs, but they 
do not require that universities provide funding in a manner proportionate 
to enrollment. 333 In fact, the implementing regulations expressly state that 
compliance does not require equitable aggregate funding, which has 
resulted in large disparities in the scholarships and operating budgets for 
men's and women's sports. 34 Prong four would not require equitable 
funding-it would be an option, an alternative to providing proportional 
opportunities under prong one.33 5 Therefore, OCR would not need to 
333. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41 (c) (2005). As noted in Part I.A, supra, the implementing regulations 
rely on other factors, primarily participation opportunity, to determine whether separate 
athletic programs for men and women are in some sense equal. 
334. See supra note 224 and accompanying text (reporting that Division I schools spend 
nearly twice as much on men's sports than on women's sports). 
335. Of course, just as OCR has done under prong one, it should not mandate strict 
proportionality of spending under prong four. A range of substantial proportionality should be 
allowed to account for reasonable differences in the costs of different sports. 
SURVEYSAYS... 
overhaul its regulations and modify the compliance policy to include prong 
four. 
To be consistent with the structuralist-equality principles, prong four 
must measure and compare gross rather than net expenditures. Especially at 
Division I colleges, football and men's basketball programs generate 
revenue, and some threatened programs, like wrestling, have attracted the 
attention of potential donors.336 If prong four measured and compared only 
the expenditures not offset by revenue, many schools that do not comply 
with prong one now would automatically comply with prong four without 
having to change their spending or athletic offerings in any way.31 
However, how much a private donor might decide to kick in to support 
his or her favorite sport, or how much the public is willing to pay for tickets 
to an Iowa/Michigan football game,3 8 have no place in the compliance 
formula. The relatively higher revenue-generating potential of certain men's 
sports derives from the very social forces that suppress women's interest and 
participation. Thus, prong four is only an appropriate compliance endpoint 
under Title IX if it asks whether a university is fairly treating its male and 
female students through aggregate gross expenditures, separate from 
external, socially constructed market demands that enable men's sports to 
generate comparatively more revenue. 
To be sure, universities face a higher burden under prong four when 
revenue is left out of the equation. Different sports have different costs 
associated with them. Market demands may force a university to spend more 
to hire a coach for its men's basketball team than its women's basketball 
team. Some of its revenue-generating men's teams may have to travel more 
frequently than women's teams in order to participate in the most 
competitive conferences. It simply may cost more to play football than crew, 
baseball than softball, men's basketball than women's basketball. In light of 
the different costs associated with different sports, universities that do not 
wish to curb spending on men's sports (especially those like football and 
basketball with the potential to generate revenue) may find it difficult to 
impossible to come close to proportional spending for its women's 
336. Chalenor v. Univ. of N.D., 291 F.3d 1042, 1048 (8th Cir. 2002) (rejecting that an offer 
from a private donor to fund a wrestling team exempted the university from proportionality 
compliance, noting that donor-funded discrimination would be attributable to the university: 
"Once a university receives a monetary donation, the funds become public money, subject to 
Tide IX's legal obligations in their disbursement."). 
337. For example, some universities where football is profitable would easily satisfy a 
compliance test that compared net expenditures rather than gross expenditures. I confirmed 
this by reviewing data reported to the Department of Education under the Equity in Athletics 
Disclosure Act of 1994, which iscompiled and reported by the Chronicle of Higher Education, 
http://chronicle.com/stats/genderequity/2004/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006). 
338. The cost of a ticket to the 2005 game was sixty dollars. See Hawkeye Sports, 
http://www.hawkeyesports.collegesports.com/tickets/iowa-tickets.html (last visited Feb. 22, 
2006). 
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programs. But this real concern is addressed by the flexibility principle 
espoused by OCR and preserved with this proposal for reform. A university 
unwilling or unable to ensure equity in expenditures does not have to do so. 
It can ensure equity in participation opportunities, that is, comply with 
prong one, instead. 
The remainder of this subpart discusses six reasons why proportionality 
in gross expenditures on women's and men's sports would be an 
appropriate method of compliance with Title IX. 
1. A Proportionate-Expenditure Prong Respects the Structuralist Model 
ofEquality Reflected in Title IX 
Equitable funding is an appropriate measure of nondiscrimination 
because it, like proportionality, does not rely on women's constructed 
relative interest to justify favored treatment for men's sports. A university 
that complies with this proposed prong four is not complicit in the social 
structures that antinormalize women's participation in sports because 
proportionate funding sends a signal, measured in dollars instead of 
numbers, to female students that it equally values their collective 
participation. 
2. A Proportionate-Expenditure Prong Would Help Control 
Excessive Spending 
Many blame rampant excessive spending in high-profile men's sports, 
like football, for the financial constraints that cause universities to struggle 
with Title IX compliance. Commentators have described football 
expenditures as an "arms race"-whatever spending one program does to 
gain a competitive edge on the field or to curry favor with recruits, other 
programs must match if they want to stay in the game.340 Luxury locker 
rooms, indoor practice facilities, lavish recruiting events, and buying out the 
contracts of coaches who fail to win championships are all examples of 
excessive spending that have driven up the cost of running competitive 
intercollegiate football programs.3 4' Some have argued that big-budget items 
339. See, e.g., Robert C. Farrell, Title IX or College Football?, 32 Hous. L. REv. 993, 1055-57 
(1995); Rich Haglund, StaringDown theElephant: College Footballand Title IX Compliance,34J.L. & 
EDUC. 439, 448-51 (2005) (exposing the "well-traveled myth that football funds other athletic 
opportunities for male and female athletes" and suggesting that reducing the number of 
football scholarships and otherwise trimming football-associated expenditures are viable 
alternatives to eliminating nonrevenue men's teams); Daniel R. Marburger & Nancy Hogshead-
Makar, Is Title IX Really to Blamefor the Decline in IntercollegiateMen's Nonrevenue Sports?, 14 MARQ. 
SPORTS L.J. 65, 91-92 (2003); Thelin, supranote 233, at 397, 399-401. 
340. Farrell, supra note 339, at 1000-01; Haglund, supra note 339, at 442; Marburger & 
Hogshead-Makar, supranote 339, at 84-85; Thelin, supra note 233, at 399-401. 
341. Farrell, supra note 339, at 1001; Haglund, supra note 339, at 442; Thelin, supra note 
233, at 399-401. Roster size is also criticized as a source of bloated expenditures. Division I 
football teams now have more than one hundred players, eighty-five on scholarship. (In 
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like these are not only wasteful, but they blur the distinction between 
342
 
professional and amateur collegiate sport. 
Universities that are striving to comply with prong four would be 
motivated to curtail unnecessary spending in the men's program to offset 
some of the spending increases in the women's program. In fact, short of 
command-and-control legislation by Congress or the NCAA, the incentive of 
Title IX compliance could be the only force operating against the collective-
action problem that has university athletic departments striving to outspend 
one another on recruiting, coaches' salaries, and facilities. 43 Prong four 
could help universities get spending under control and also restore college 
football's amateur character. 
3. 	 Compliance with a Proportionate-Expenditure Prong Is Based 
on Predictable Factors Under the University's Control 
Like the factors contributing to a university's prong-one proportionality 
score, equitable funding is based on factors that are predictable and within a 
university's control. OCR or a reviewing court would have to engage in some 
subjective inquiry to ensure that a university is not attempting to pass off as 
general, unallocated expenditures money that is actually being spent on 
men's sports. However, as long as a university submits an honest and equal 
budget, it can be assured that neither a court nor OCR will find that its 
athletic program is discriminatory in violation of Title IX. 
4. Equitable Funding Compliance Could Mitigate Backlash 
Against Title IX 
Turning the dialogue to money instead of participation opportunities 
could also help militate against Title IX backlash and create a healthier 
dialogue about equity in sports. By focusing universities (and their 
constituents) on the real problem of inflated athletic department budgets,
"trading" a male wrestler for a female volleyball player ceases to be the 
operative rhetoric. Instead, if the wrestling team loses an assistant coach or a 
training table due to budget cuts, it might notice that women's volleyball 
received a commensurate gain, but it will also notice that men's football has 
a staff of twenty-three. By changing the debate from one about athletes to 
dollars spent on various athletes, the hope is that men's sports will start 
contrast, NFL teams are half as large.) Farrell, supra note 339, at 1056-57 ("A team that is 
playing a game with 11 players on the field does not need 140 players or even 100 players. 
Professional teams in the National Football League have 47 players."). Big football rosters 
increase the number of women's opportunities a university must provide to attain 
proportionality compliance. 
342. 	 Farrell, supranote 339, at 998. 
343. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 6, at 25 (acknowledging the need for national 
action to control the escalating costs of intercollegiate athletics). 
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comparing themselves to-and taking out their demands for equality on-
the teams on their side of the ledger. 
5. Universities that Comply with a Proportionate-Expenditure Prong Are 
Still Likely to Increase Participation Opportunities for Women 
Even if proportionate expenditure, rather than proportionate 
opportunity, is a university's compliance objective, the university is still likely 
to continue to add participation opportunities for women. The larger the 
disparities between its expenditures for men's and women's programs (and 
the less it is willing to cut from the men's side of the ledger), the more it has 
to invest in women's sports to achieve equitable funding. Some of this 
reinvestment is just as likely to increase the quantity as well as the quality of 
participation opportunities for female athletes. 
To be sure, once a university achieves proportionate expenditures, it 
would be free to add opportunities for men and cut opportunities for 
women, so long as the aggregate funding for men's and women's sports stays 
constant. But this possible reduction in athletic opportunities for women 
under this approach is defensible because it comes with a commensurate 
gain in the quality of opportunity. Proportionality compliance pressures 
athletic departments to stretch women's programs' relatively smaller budgets 
over as many female athletes as possible. Compared to an individual male 
athlete, a female athlete may have less access to coaching, support, training 
facilities, and meals. These inequities contribute to the perception that 
universities favor men's sports and, therefore, do not cultivate women's 
interest in sports to the same extent as men's. In an equitable funding 
regime, universities use dollars instead of an athlete headcount to 
demonstrate that they equally value women's athletics. 
6. 	 A Proportionate-Expenditure Prong Would Eliminate "Artificial" 
Caps and Floors 
Another benefit to prong-four compliance is that it eliminates the 
pressure on universities to artificially cap the number of players on men's 
teams or expand the number of players on women's teams. Many schools 
opt to attain prong-one proportionality compliance through some 
combination of adding opportunities for women, while reducing the size of 
men's teams. Cuts on the men's side usually squeeze out the players who 
were not recruited. The Commission called this an "artificial" cap, noting 
that because these players do not cost the university any scholarship dollars, 
cutting their opportunities does not result in any commensurate benefit for 
women.344 On the women's side, universities often add whole new teams, but 
344. See id. at 30. Cutting opportunities for walk-on players may be a politically problematic 
consequence associated with proportionality compliance, but it is not a legal problem. Title IX 
compels universities to end the discriminatory distribution of athletic opportunities, which can 
SURVEY SAYS... 
they also sometimes require coaches to add more women to a team than the 
coach would prefer to carry.145 If a university opted to satisfy proportionate 
expenditures instead of proportionate opportunity, the only limit to the size 
of its men's teams would be the size of its equalized budget.3
4 6 
V. CONCLUSION 
The political debate about the Model Survey is, on the surface, a debate 
about methodology--how institutions should be allowed to demonstrate 
women's lack of interest in complying with Title IX. The 2005 Clarification 
policy should be repealed. As a survey, it is methodologically flawed. As a 
concept, it is destined to "provide[] only a measure of the very 
discrimination that is and has been the basis for women's lack of" 4 7 
0opportunity to participate in sports. 
However, the 2005 Clarification also helps expose two latent 
inconsistencies that have perpetuated confusion and political opposition to 
Title IX: first, the inconsistency between interest-defined compliance and 
structuralist equality; and second, the resulting inconsistency between the 
fact that the three-prong policy operates to favor proportionality and OCR's 
insistence that it is a flexible test. For Title IX's regulatory policy to be 
effective, OCR must resolve these inconsistencies by retreating from its 
rhetoric of flexibility regarding prong-three compliance and by offering 
institutions the option to rely on something other than women's interests as 
a benchmark for compliance. 
be achieved by bolstering opportunities for women or just as well by eliminating athletics 
altogether. Kelley v. Bd. of Trs., 35 F.3d 265, 272 ("Title IX's stated objective is not to ensure 
that athletic opportunities available to women increase. Rather, its avowed purpose is to 
prohibit educational institutions from discriminating on the basis of sex."); see also Chalenor v. 
Univ. of N.D., 291 F.3d 1042, 1048-49 (8th Cir. 2002). 
345. See, e.g.,UNIV. OF IOWA, ATHLETICs REVIEW MERGER COMMITIEE FINAL REPORT 8 
(Apr. 2005), available at http://www.uiowa.edu/president/task-forces/athletics-merger/ 
042505athletics-merger.pdf (recommending that the University of Iowa consider roster floors as 
well as caps). Iowa found that coaches of its women's teams often prefer smaller teams because 
they cannot afford to stretch their budgets over many additional players. A school that equalizes 
funding between men's and women's programs would likely ameliorate this problem, giving 
coaches of women's teams the flexibility to take walk-on players if they wanted to. 
346. If walk-on players truly do not cost universities anything, then rosters have no limit. 
But if, as one might suspect, there are costs associated with training, feeding, outfitting, gearing, 
and providing travel for these players (notwithstanding proportionality opponents' claims that 
they do not cost anything), these costs will influence a coach's decision on how many walk-on 
players a team can afford. 
347. Cohen v. Brown Univ., 101 F.3d 155,179 (lstCir. 1996). 
